The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving by Sheremeta, Roman & Uler, Neslihan
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful
Government Spending on Giving
Sheremeta, Roman and Uler, Neslihan
22 July 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102348/
MPRA Paper No. 102348, posted 13 Aug 2020 07:55 UTC
1 
 
 
The Impact of Taxes and Wasteful Government Spending on Giving 
 
Roman M. Sheremeta a,b 
Neslihan Uler c,* 
 
a Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University 
11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA 
b Economic Science Institute, Chapman University 
One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA  
c Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland 
7998 Regents Dr, College Park, MD 20742, USA 
 
 
 
 
July 22, 2020 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine how taxes impact charitable giving and how this relationship is affected by the degree 
of wasteful government spending. In our model, individuals make donations to charities knowing 
that the government collects a flat-rate tax on income (net of charitable donations) and redistributes 
part of the tax revenue. The rest of the tax revenue is wasted. The model predicts that a higher tax 
rate increases charitable donations. Surprisingly, the model shows that a higher degree of waste 
decreases donations (when the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption is high 
enough). We test the model’s predictions using a laboratory experiment with actual donations to 
charities and find that the tax rate has an insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, 
however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect on giving. 
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1. Introduction 
Polls conducted in the US show that people believe that part of tax revenue is wasted by 
the government. According to a 2014 Gallup Poll, Americans estimate that the federal government 
wastes 51% of each dollar collected through taxes.1 Similarly, according to a HuffPost/YouGov 
poll conducted in 2013, 69% of Americans think that most of the federal budget deficit could be 
eliminated by cutting “waste and fraud,” examples of which include “wasteful spending” on 
salaries and perks for government employees, foreign aid, and military spending.2 
In this paper, we investigate how taxation affects charitable giving in the presence of a 
redistributive government that wastes part of the tax revenue it collects from individuals. Our paper 
makes two novel contributions to the literature. First, while a sizable literature studies the 
relationship between tax rates and (tax-exempt) donations using empirical data, to our knowledge 
we are the first to study the impact of the tax rate on charitable giving using a controlled experiment 
with actual donations. Moreover, we study the relationship between the tax rate and charitable 
giving by systematically varying how much of the tax revenue is redistributed back to individuals, 
ranging from no redistribution to full redistribution.3 Second, we study the impact of wasteful 
government spending on giving. We show that when part of the tax revenue is wasted (instead of 
being redistributed back to individuals), both the price of giving and the net income of individuals 
depend not only on the tax rate but also on the degree of waste. By keeping the tax rate constant, 
we study the effect of changing the rate of waste on donations. 
To examine how taxes impact giving and how this relationship is affected by the 
wastefulness of government spending, we provide a game-theoretic model. In our model, a public 
good is provided through private contributions by individuals. The government’s role is to collect 
a flat-rate tax on income net of contributions to the public good and to redistribute the tax revenue. 
During redistribution, part of the collected tax revenue is wasted (e.g., the government spends this 
money on things that the individuals do not value). As the tax rate increases, both the price of tax-
deductible charitable giving and the income of contributors decrease, creating an ambiguous effect 
on donations.  
Consistent with previous theoretical and empirical literature, our model predicts that under 
weak assumptions the substitution effect dominates the income effect and, hence, there is a positive 
relationship between charitable donations and the tax rate (keeping the level of waste constant). In 
                                               
1 See http://www.gallup.com/poll/176102/americans-say-federal-gov-wastes-cents-dollar.aspx. The estimated rate of 
waste differs across Republicans and Democrats, with Republicans estimating 59 cents and Democrats estimating 42 
cents per dollar. To isolate the effect of waste on giving, we consider a simple model with individuals being 
homogeneous with respect to their perceptions of the rate of waste. 
2 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/wasteful-spending-poll_n_2886081.html. Based on the survey 
responses the article argues that “for many, waste is indeed defined as ‘money spent on some government program I 
don’t like’.” Note that these perceptions may exogenously change over time depending on government actions or even 
through simple debates (e.g., discussions of wasteful government spending during elections may heighten individuals’ 
perceptions about waste). 
3 To our knowledge, previous theoretical and empirical models on the impact of tax rates on donations assume one of 
the two extreme cases. For example, when calculating the price of giving, empirical studies typically make the 
simplifying assumption that individuals do not receive any return from their paid taxes. Previous models are, therefore, 
special cases of our model.  
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other words, our model shows that the results of the previous literature regarding the relationship 
between tax rate and giving continues to hold even if there is wasteful governmental spending. 
Moreover, our model allows us to study the relationship between the level of waste and donations 
to charities. A change in the rate of waste also creates opposing substitution and income effects. 
While one might expect donations to the privately provided public good (charity) to increase as 
the government wastes more of the tax revenue, our model demonstrates the opposite might be 
true. We show that although increasing the degree of waste creates a small decrease in the price of 
giving, the negative income effect might be sizable. Depending on the elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to consumption, the income effect may dominate the substitution effect when the rate 
of waste increases. In addition, our model shows that, in large economies, the income effect always 
dominates the substitution effect when the degree of waste increases, leading to a negative 
relationship between the rate of waste and donations.  
We test our model using a laboratory experiment with actual donations to charities. As 
opposed to naturally occurring data, our controlled environment removes several potential 
confounding factors, such as differences in beliefs about how tax revenue is used, changes in 
income over time, as well as other potential confounds which one usually needs to control for 
when estimating the impact of taxes on charitable donations.4 In our experiment, participants earn 
income, part of which they can donate to a charity. Participants choose their donations knowing 
that a flat-rate tax will be applied to their remaining income, with part of the collected tax revenue 
going back to the experimenter and the remaining portion being evenly redistributed among the 
participants. By systematically varying the level of taxes and how much of the tax revenue is 
wasted (i.e., money received neither by charities nor by participants), we are able to isolate and 
test the impact of the tax rate and wasteful spending of tax revenue on giving. 
Our experimental data indicate that the tax rate has an insignificant effect on giving. The 
degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect on giving. Consistent 
with our theoretical predictions, we find that the relationship between giving and waste depends 
on the elasticity of marginal utility. In addition, we show that our results do not depend on the 
initial income distribution.5 Moreover, we conduct an additional experiment as a robustness check 
                                               
4 Field data suffer from measurement and identification challenges (e.g., Andreoni, 2006; List, 2011; Andreoni and 
Payne, 2013; Vesterlund, 2016; Duquette, 2016). Itemizers have an incentive to overstate their donations to evade 
taxes, while non-itemizers have no incentive to report any donations at all. The price of giving is correlated with 
taxable income and might endogenously change with the donated amount. It is hard to disentangle the permanent 
impact of taxes on donations from the transitory impact. Wasteful government spending may provoke tax evasion 
which might in turn affect charitable donations (Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Alm et al., 2016). There is also the 
possibility that tax rates affect labor supply decisions; see Saez et al. (2012) for a survey of this literature. Our design 
eliminates these types of measurement and identification challenges by: (1) exogenously varying the price of giving 
and the level of waste, (2) using actual donations data from our controlled laboratory experiment, (3) automatically 
taxing all participants in the experiment and (4) by assigning income to participants prior to informing them about the 
specifics of income taxation and the tax rate.  
5 Our paper also contributes to the literature on income inequality and public goods provision (e.g., Chan et al., 1996, 
1999; Anderson et al. 2008; Uler, 2011; Maurice et al., 2013; Duquette and Hargaden, 2019). We find qualitative 
support for the neutrality result of Bergstrom et al. (1986).  
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and confirm that charitable giving is insensitive to the tax rate even when subjects are given the 
opportunity to learn through repetition and feedback.  
Our study has important policy implications. We find that, on average, the relationship 
between the tax rate and donations is economically small and statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that changes in taxes may not affect charitable giving as suggested by previous literature. In 
addition, the degree of waste plays a large role in giving decisions. Our experiment shows that 
even for very small economies, the effect of wasteful government spending on giving is negative. 
Our theory predicts that for larger economies the effect of wasteful government spending will be 
even more negative. Our results suggest two potential mechanisms through which policymakers 
might generate a substantial increase in charitable giving: (1) increasing the efficiency with which 
the tax revenue is used (that is, decreasing “waste”), and/or (2) providing individuals with better 
information on the benefits of the public services financed by tax revenues and on the effective 
use of the tax revenue (that is, decreasing perception of waste). Finally, it is important to recognize 
that tax rates themselves might endogenously affect perceptions about wasteful government 
spending. For example, if individuals perceive that higher taxes imply more waste, then we may 
actually see a decrease (not an increase) in charitable donations as taxes increase. Our results imply 
that empirical studies estimating price and income elasticities of giving would benefit from 
controlling for the confounding effect of perceptions about wasteful government spending. 
Before we discuss the previous literature, we want to comment on three important points. 
First, for simplification purposes, this paper focuses on the redistributive role of the government, 
i.e., we assume that the tax revenue is being redistributed. Since redistribution is a special form of 
a (publicly provided) public good, it is not difficult to generalize the model to allow for the 
government to provide any public good, as long as the public good provided by the government is 
different than that provided by the charity. The only difference is that, in the latter case, our results 
would condition on the utility over the public good provided by the government (instead of on the 
consumption utility). Second, our theoretical results rely on the assumption that the charity and the 
government provide different public goods. If the government uses tax revenue to provide the same 
public good as the charity (or to provide a grant to the charitable organization), then a higher tax 
rate leads to lower donations to the charity when the level of waste is fixed, and a higher rate of 
waste by the government leads to higher donations to the charity when the tax rate is fixed.6 While 
this case is also interesting, this paper focuses on the case where government and the charity 
provide different public goods.7 This allows us to predict a positive relationship between donations 
and the tax rate, consistent with the large empirical literature on this topic.8 Third, one might argue 
that individuals simply do not think about receiving a direct return from their paid taxes and 
                                               
6 These predictions follow immediately from the crowding-out literature (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Bolton and Katok, 
1998; Eckel et al., 2005; Li et al., 2011), since this case implies governmental provision and charitable provision are 
perfect substitutes. 
7 One important example of public goods in which individuals make donations, but the government does not, is giving 
to religious organizations. 
8 See Section 2 for a discussion of the major findings of the empirical literature on this topic. 
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consider their taxes as forgone money. This interpretation is actually a special case of our model 
(i.e., redistribution rate is 0%).  
We discuss related literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our theoretical model 
and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our experimental design and procedures. 
Section 5 provides the results of the experiment. Section 6 provides the results of an additional 
experiment designed to check the robustness of our results. Section 7 provides a short discussion 
and our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the United States, individual (private) donations constitute one of the major sources of 
revenue for many charities. Since most charitable donations are tax-deductible, a higher tax rate 
affects charitable giving in two major ways. On the one hand, because of deduction benefits, higher 
taxes decrease the price of giving, which leads to a positive effect on giving (the substitution 
effect). On the other hand, higher taxes reduce after-tax net income, which has a negative effect 
on donations (the income effect). The empirical literature generally finds the net effect to be 
positive, but provides mixed findings regarding its magnitude, with the net effect ranging from 
zero to substantial levels (Clotfelter, 1985, 1990; Randolph, 1995; Auten et al., 2002; Peloza and 
Steel, 2005; Bakija and Heim, 2011; Duquette, 2016; Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2018).9  
Earlier empirical studies using cross-sectional data argue that a tax cut leads to a decrease 
in charitable giving. In particular, Clotfelter (1985, 1990) estimates the price elasticity to be greater 
than one in absolute value and the income elasticity to be less than one. Using panel data, Randolph 
(1995) finds that charitable giving is relatively insensitive to price changes, suggesting that 
permanent changes in the price of giving have a small effect on voluntary contributions. In 
contrast, Auten et al. (2002) find a substantially larger permanent-price elasticity using a different 
estimation technique. More recently, Bakija and Heim (2011) and Duquette (2016) find that the 
price elasticity of giving is greater than one in absolute value, while Hungerman and Ottoni-
Wilhelm (2018) report a price elasticity of 0.2. Estimates of price and income elasticities like those 
discussed above are very sensitive to the estimation techniques and the data sets being used. Since 
observational data suffer from problems of identification and measurement, the net effect of 
taxation on charitable donations is still not clearly understood (Andreoni, 2006; List, 2011; 
Andreoni and Payne, 2013; Vesterlund, 2016). 
A theoretical foundation for the impact of redistributive taxation on charitable giving has 
been provided by Warr (1982) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). These papers show that purely 
redistributive taxation (that does not change the set of contributors) should have no effect on total 
                                               
9 Some of these papers study a related (but different) question. They ask, for a given tax rate, how responsive total 
giving is to tax-deductibility and focus on estimates of price-elasticity only. Theoretically, it is easy to show that the 
impact of tax-deductibility on donations is (unambiguously) positive, since tax-deductions make it cheaper to donate 
and individuals enjoy higher levels of spendable income for a given level of donation. In other words, there are no 
opposing forces when it comes to the effect of tax-deductibility on donations.  
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public goods provision.10 Uler (2009) extends the standard model by assuming that charitable 
donations to the public good are tax-deductible and, therefore, redistribution takes place over 
income net of contributions. The model demonstrates that, under a general class of utility 
functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases 
when the tax rate increases. These models, however, have not addressed the case of wasteful 
government spending (i.e., the case when part of the tax revenue is wasted). 
In addition to these empirical and theoretical studies, a number of experimental papers have 
analyzed how price and income affect individuals’ giving. Most experimental studies find that, as 
predicted by economic theory, giving moves inversely with price (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; 
Andreoni and Miller, 2002).11 For example, Eckel and Grossman (2003) conduct a laboratory 
experiment in which participants choose how much to contribute to a charity under different rebate 
and match rates and find that contributions (received by the charity) move inversely with price.12 
Eckel and Grossman (2008) replicate their laboratory findings in a natural field setting. Similarly, 
Karlan and List (2007) find a negative relationship between price and giving (within a certain 
range of prices). In particular, they find that offering to match contributions ($1:$1) increases 
individual giving, but further lowering the price by offering larger match ratios ($3:$1 and $2:$1) 
has no additional impact on giving (not including the match).13 Huck and Rasul (2011) report price 
elasticities between -0.53 and -1.12 and Filiz-Ozbay and Uler (2019) find price elasticities in the 
range of -0.3 to -0.9. Experimental evidence about the relationship between income and giving is 
mixed. Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2008), Eckel et al. (2007) and Rey-Biel et al. (2018) find a 
positive relationship between income and giving, while others find a negative relationship (Erkal 
et al., 2011) or no significant relationship at all (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Buckley and 
Croson, 2006).14  
None of these experimental studies are in the context of taxation, however. While previous 
experimental literature is helpful to understand how individuals’ charitable donation decisions 
react to changes in prices and incomes, it is hard to extrapolate from these studies to how 
individuals will react to changes in tax rates or wasteful government spending. The impact of the 
rebate or match rate on total donations received by the charity is different than the impact of the 
rate of tax or waste.15 Moreover, individuals might respond to lower income very differently when 
lower income is a consequence of a higher tax rate.  
                                               
10 This result would not hold if individuals are impure-altruists (Andreoni, 1990). Impure altruism models explain why 
crowding-out is not complete when government provides public funds to charities. Interestingly, Hungerman (2014) 
shows that when individuals hide income, this creates a deadweight loss and leads to a surprising finding: warm-glow 
implies more crowding-out in a setting where individuals can evade taxes. 
11 Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) focus on gender differences in altruism and show that men are more price sensitive. 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that preferences for altruism can be explained by rational models. 
12 They also find that subjects are sensitive to how a subsidy is framed. Other studies comparing subsidy types include 
Davis et al. (2005), Davis and Millner (2005), Eckel and Grossman (2006a, 2006b), and Blumenthal et al. (2012). 
13 Duquette and Hargaden (2019), on the other hand, find a positive relationship between the match rate and donations 
even for very large values of the match rate.  
14 Auten et al. (2000) argue that the relationship between income and donations is U-shaped. 
15 Theoretically, assuming a concave consumption utility, when considering rebates or matches offered by a third 
party, an increase in the rebate or match rate always leads to higher total donations received by the charity (including 
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In the study most related to ours, Uler (2011) examines the relationship between the tax 
rate and individual contributions within a laboratory public goods setting. In public goods game 
experiments, donations have explicit monetary benefits for each participant, while charitable 
contributions in the field do not usually generate analogous monetary benefits. More importantly, 
a public goods game enforces a particular payoff structure and does not allow for estimation of the 
actual net effect of a tax rate change on donations to real charities. As such, the results of Uler 
(2011) may not be generalizable to charitable giving decisions in the real world (Levitt and List, 
2007). Our paper provides a more realistic set-up in which subjects make actual charitable 
donations and allows for the possibility of wasteful government spending. In addition, we study 
the impact of the rate of waste on donations (keeping the tax rate constant). 
 
3. The Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
3.1. The Model 
We consider an environment with one private good, one pure public good, and 𝑛𝑛 > 1 
agents. The public good is provided privately through charitable contributions. Each agent 𝑖𝑖 has 
an income of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 units of a private good, and contributes (donates) 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 to the public good. One unit 
of the public good can be produced by one unit of the private good. Therefore, the level of public 
good provision is equal to total contributions, i.e., 𝐺𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . The total income in the economy 
is denoted by 𝑌𝑌 = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
The government collects a flat-rate tax 𝑡𝑡, 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1, on income net of charitable 
contributions towards the public good and redistributes the tax revenue equally across the n agents. 
During redistribution, part of the collected tax revenue 𝑤𝑤, 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 1, is wasted.16 Therefore, 
individual 𝑖𝑖’s private consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, after contributing to the public good, paying his/her taxes 
and receiving any refund from the government, is given by: 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤𝑤) 𝑡𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗−𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛 .     (1) 
Individual preferences are represented by an additively separable utility function 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) +𝑣𝑣(𝐺𝐺), where 𝑢𝑢(. ) and 𝑣𝑣(. ) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously 
differentiable functions and satisfy the Inada conditions. Finally, to simplify the analysis, we 
assume everyone contributes to the public good in the equilibrium. This assumption is reasonable 
as long as the ex-ante wealth inequality between agents is not very large (Bergstrom et al., 1986; 
Uler, 2009).  
                                               
the matches). To see why increasing the rebate/match rate does not lead to ambiguous effects on donations received 
by the charity the way increasing the rate of tax or waste does, consider the following examples. When the rebate (or 
match) rate increases, an individual might still choose to donate nothing and consume his/her available wealth. When 
a tax rate increases, however, the individual’s net income strictly decreases even when he/she does not donate anything 
to the charity. Alternatively, when the rebate (or match rate) increases, an individual can donate the same (total) level 
as before and enjoy a higher net income. In contrast, when the tax rate increases, if the individual donates the same 
level as before, then he/she will definitely have a lower net income. 
16 One can think of the “waste” as either the government funding programs that the individuals do not care for, or 
inefficient spending.  
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Each individual chooses their contribution level, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖, by taking other individuals’ 
contributions as given. The first-order condition for an individual 𝑖𝑖 is given by: 𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) �1 − �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 � 𝑡𝑡� = 𝑣𝑣′(𝐺𝐺).       (2) 
Since the right hand side of this equation is the same for each individual, we can infer that, 
in equilibrium, all agents consume the same amount of the private good. Note that this implies that 
the “neutrality” result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) also holds in this model: total public goods 
provision does not depend on the initial income distribution.17 The first-order condition simplifies 
to: 𝑢𝑢′ �(1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 ���1 − �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 � 𝑡𝑡� = 𝑣𝑣′(𝐺𝐺).     (3) 
This condition is intuitive. Each agent chooses the level of contribution that would equalize the 
marginal benefit of contributing to the marginal cost of an additional unit of contribution. Note 
that the equilibrium is uniquely determined.18 
The first question we seek to address is what happens to contributions when the tax rate 
increases for a given degree of waste. Equation (3) shows that higher taxes have two opposing 
effects on the equilibrium level of contributions: (i) a higher tax rate implies a lower price of 
giving, which has a positive effect on contributions (the substitution effect), and (ii) a higher tax 
rate implies lower net income, which has a negative effect on contributions (the income effect). 
To solve for the net effect of taxes on giving, we differentiate equation (3) with respect to the tax 
rate 𝑡𝑡 and then solve for 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡  : 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 = − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)+𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣′′(𝐺𝐺)+𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�1−𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) ,       (4) 
where 𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 ) and 𝑏𝑏 = (1 −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �. Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑡𝑡.  
When 𝑤𝑤 = 0, the income effect disappears (i.e., 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) becomes zero) 
and the positive relationship between 𝐺𝐺 and 𝑡𝑡 holds without any additional assumptions about the 
curvature of consumption utility (also see Uler, 2009). When 𝑤𝑤 > 0, however, whether the 
relationship between total public goods provision and the tax rate is positive or not depends on the 
curvature of the consumption utility. Our first theorem, generalizing the findings of Bergstrom et 
al. (1986) and Uler (2009), follows: 
 
                                               
17 Similar to Bergstrom et al. (1986), this result holds only when the set of contributors does not change as the initial 
income distribution changes. If the set of contributors changes when the initial income distribution changes, then the 
model would predict higher contributions when income inequality increases. Hence, similar to Bergstrom et al. (1986) 
and Uler (2009), there is a trade-off between contributions and (initial) income equality. 
18 This can be seen by using equation (1) and the fact that each individual consumes the same amount of the private 
good. 
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Theorem 1. For a given degree of waste, 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 < 1, if 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) satisfies − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 1, then the total 
public good provision 𝐺𝐺 is a strictly increasing function of the tax rate 𝑡𝑡. When 𝑤𝑤 = 1, 𝐺𝐺 is a 
strictly increasing function of the tax rate, if − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) < 1.  
 
To simplify the presentation of the paper, all proofs are provided in an online appendix 
(see Appendix A). Theorem 1 shows that whether individuals increase their donations when the 
tax rate increases depends on the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, given 
by − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) .19 Note that in environments that involve risk, the elasticity of marginal utility 
corresponds to the relative risk aversion coefficient. 
 
Corollary 1. If the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) utility function, 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑥𝑥(1−𝜃𝜃)
(1−𝜃𝜃)  for 0 < 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢𝑢 = ln (𝑥𝑥) for 𝜃𝜃 = 1, then, for a 
given degree of waste 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 < 1 and for 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1, public good provision strictly increases as the 
tax rate increases. When 𝑤𝑤 = 1, public good provision strictly increases as the tax rate increases, 
if 𝜃𝜃 < 1. 
 
The conditions provided in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are mild. In fact, as we explain in 
Sections 3 and 4, we approximate individuals’ elasticities of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption by using data from a risk elicitation task in our experiment. We find that only three 
percent of subjects have an elasticity coefficient greater than one. Therefore, one would expect the 
substitution effect to dominate the income effect as the tax rate increases. Theorem 1 and Corollary 
1 are, however, silent regarding the magnitude of the net effect.  
Next, we study whether 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 is smaller or larger than 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 . Equation (3) shows that a higher 
degree of waste has two opposing effects on the equilibrium level of contributions: (i) a higher 
degree of waste implies a lower price of giving, which has a positive effect on contributions (the 
substitution effect), and (ii) a higher degree of waste implies a lower net income, which has a 
negative effect on contributions (the income effect). The substitution effect is always higher for 
the tax change than the wasteful spending change, which can be seen by examining the relative 
change in the price of giving generated by these two variables. The effect of a small change in the 
tax rate on the price of giving is given by �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �, whereas the effect of a small change in the 
rate of waste on the price of giving is given by 
𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛. Since �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 � is always greater than 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 for any 
                                               
19 Note that 
𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑′(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 . The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption can also be 
interpreted as the sensitivity of the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and public good 
consumption to price changes: the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution with respect to the price of private 
consumption (see Mirrlees, 1971). We are grateful to Daniel Hungerman for this insight. 
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𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤, the substitution effect in the case of waste 𝑤𝑤 is smaller than the substitution effect in the 
case of tax rate 𝑡𝑡. It is also easy to see that the income effect of increasing the degree of waste is 
at least as large as the income effect of increasing the tax rate when 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑤𝑤. Therefore, for any 𝑡𝑡 ≥𝑤𝑤, the net effect of the tax rate on public goods provision is always larger in the relative sense than 
the net effect of the rate of waste.20 It is, however, challenging to see how 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 compares with 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡  
for 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑤𝑤. Theorem 2 shows that, if the elasticity of marginal utility function with respect to 
consumption is less than or equal to one, then the marginal effect of increasing the tax rate on 
giving is larger than the marginal effect of increasing the degree of waste on giving, independent 
of the degree of waste and the tax rate.  
 
Theorem 2. If 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) satisfies − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 1, then 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 > 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 for any 0 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 1. 
 
While Theorem 2 provides us with the relative comparison of the marginal effects of 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤, it does not inform us regarding the sign of 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤. To solve for the net effect of 𝑤𝑤 on giving while 
fixing the tax rate, we differentiate equation (3) with respect to 𝑤𝑤 and then solve for 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤: 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 = − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)+𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣′′(𝐺𝐺)+𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�1−𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) .       (5) 
Since the denominator in equation (5) is always negative, the sign of the numerator determines the 
sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑤𝑤. Theorem 3 provides the sufficient condition 
for the substitution effect to dominate the income effect. Given the result in Theorem 2, one would 
expect to have a more restrictive sufficient condition in order to have a positive relationship 
between 𝐺𝐺 and 𝑤𝑤, and this is exactly what we see in Theorem 3. 
 
Theorem 3. For a given tax rate 0 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1, if 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) satisfies − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 1𝑛𝑛, then the total public 
good provision 𝐺𝐺 is a strictly increasing function of the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤. 
 
Note that the sufficient condition in Theorem 3 does not hold for any 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2, if 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) is a 
CRRA utility function with 𝜃𝜃 > 12 (see Corollary 2). 
 
Corollary 2. If the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the CRRA utility function 𝑢𝑢 =𝑥𝑥(1−𝜃𝜃)
(1−𝜃𝜃) for 0 < 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢𝑢 = ln (𝑥𝑥) for 𝜃𝜃 = 1, then giving strictly increases when the degree of 
waste increases if 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1𝑛𝑛. 
 
                                               
20 For example, if 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 = −4, then the partial derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑡𝑡 is greater than the partial 
derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑤𝑤 in the relative sense. 
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We also see that as 𝑛𝑛 increases it becomes harder to satisfy the sufficient condition 
provided in Theorem 3 and Corollary 2.21 For example, for agents with a CRRA utility function, 
this condition will not hold for any positive 𝜃𝜃 as 𝑛𝑛 → ∞. This important result suggests that, in 
large economies, the income effect dominates the substitution effect and leads to a negative 
relationship between the rate of waste and donations to the public good. 
While Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 are useful in providing the sufficient condition for a 
positive relationship between donations and the rate of waste, they do not inform us when to expect 
a definite negative relationship. Theorem 4 derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
income effect to dominate the substitution effect for CRRA utility functions. It shows that, 
assuming the CRRA utility function, donations decrease in the degree of waste if and only if 𝜃𝜃 >
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛. Note that the condition in Theorem 4 is satisfied for any positive 𝜃𝜃 in very large 
economies. 
 
Theorem 4. Suppose the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the CRRA utility 
function. Then, 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 < 0 if and only if 𝜃𝜃 > (1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛.22  
 
Corollary 3 shows that if individuals have logarithmic consumption utility, then charitable 
donations increase when the tax rate increases and decrease when the degree of waste increases, 
independent of the size of the economy. 
 
Corollary 3. If the agents’ preferences are given by ln(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑣𝑣(𝐺𝐺), then (i) for a given 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 < 1, 
public good provision increases when 𝑡𝑡 increases, and (ii) for a given 0 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1, public good 
provision decreases when 𝑤𝑤 increases.  
 
Note that (i) is true because the sufficient condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, and (ii) comes 
from Theorem 4, since 
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 < 1 for any 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2. Corollary 3 illustrates a simple example where 
the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect as the tax rate increases, while the income 
effect dominates the substitution effect as the degree of waste increases.  
Theorem 4 and Corollary 3 are surprising. They show that, when a change in the degree of 
waste is considered, the income effect dominates the substitution effect under common utility 
functions. The intuition behind these results is the following: increasing the degree of waste has 
only a small effect on lowering the relative price (or opportunity cost) of donations, because 
individuals do not expect to get much direct return from paying their taxes. This is especially true 
when the size of the economy is large, since individuals mostly consider their paid taxes as lost 
money and governmental waste has little positive impact on the price of donations. On the other 
                                               
21 In the experiment, we have three people in our experimental society. If this condition does not hold for 𝑛𝑛 = 3, then 
we do not expect it to hold with 𝑛𝑛 > 3. 
22 Note that 
1𝑛𝑛 ≤ (1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 < 1 for any 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1. (1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 equals 1𝑛𝑛 when 𝑤𝑤 = 1. 
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hand, taxes are used to provide a governmental public good (i.e., redistribution). But, if the 
government is wasting the tax revenue, individuals receive lower transfers and therefore get 
poorer. Given that individuals are poorer, they have less money to donate to charities. The income 
effect has a strong negative effect on donations. 
Before discussing our hypotheses, we first mention that our results are not limited to purely 
altruistic agents. Alternatively, individuals might have warm-glow preferences, i.e., receive utility 
only from their own donations to the charity (Andreoni 1989, 1990). By using a CRRA 
formulation, it is not hard to show that all of our results continue to hold if the agents have warm-
glow preferences.23 In addition, our results on the effects of the tax rate and the degree of waste 
on giving also do not depend on the assumption that everyone contributes to the public good.24 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
We derive five testable hypotheses. According to our model, total donations and individual 
donations move in the same direction.25 We state our hypotheses at the individual level in order to 
utilize our data set more effectively and to conduct robustness checks by controlling for individual-
specific variables such as income and demographics.  
Based on Theorem 1, we conjecture that individual donations increase when the tax rate 
increases (see Hypothesis 1).26 Note that Hypothesis 1 is also consistent with the previous 
empirical literature that suggests a positive relationship between charitable giving and the tax rate. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Individual giving increases when the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 increases.  
 
Second, based on Theorem 2, we provide a hypothesis regarding the relative impact of the 
effects of the tax rate and the degree of waste on individual giving.  
 
Hypothesis 2. The marginal effect of the tax rate on giving is larger than the marginal effect of 
the degree of waste on giving. 
                                               
23 We assume individual 𝑖𝑖’s utility function is given by: 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃  for 0 < 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 1 and ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) + ln (𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) for 𝜃𝜃 = 1. We 
find that total public goods provision, 𝐺𝐺, is equal to (1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)1𝜃𝜃+(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡). It is not difficult to calculate 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡  and 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤, and confirm 
that all of our results continue to hold. Future research could generalize our findings beyond a CRRA formulation.  
24 Our main results do not change when we allow for non-contributors. In particular, the sufficient conditions provided 
in Theorems 1-3 stay the same. For example, take Theorem 1. Under the sufficient condition provided in Theorem 1, 
for a given degree of waste, it is possible to show that (i) as t increases, the set of contributors (weakly) increases and 
(ii) 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 > 0 for any t. Similarly, all of our corollaries continue to hold. The only adjustment that needs to be done is for 
Theorem 4. While the threshold provided in Theorem 4 becomes larger when we allow for non-contributors, it can be 
shown that it is still strictly less than 1. In addition, it is not difficult to show that, for a given rate of tax, (i) as w 
increases, the set of contributors (weakly) decreases, and (ii) 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 < 0 for any 𝑤𝑤. 
25 This can be easily seen from equation (1) and the fact that, in equilibrium, all individuals enjoy the same net 
consumption. In the case of corner solutions, total donations and average individual donations move in the same 
direction. 
26 Recall that the condition provided in Theorem 1 is very mild and that only three percent of subjects did not satisfy 
this condition. 
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Recall that Theorem 3 predicts that if the elasticity of marginal utility is smaller than or 
equal to 
1𝑛𝑛, then giving is an increasing function of the degree of waste. Theorem 4 states that if 
individuals have CRRA preferences and the elasticity of marginal utility is larger than 
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛, then 
giving should decrease when the degree of waste increases.27 Assuming our participants’ elasticity 
of marginal utility is large enough, we conjecture that the relationship between giving and 𝑤𝑤 is 
negative. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Individual giving decreases when the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 increases. 
 
While our model considers homogeneous agents, we also derive predictions for 
heterogeneous agents assuming that individuals believe others to have similar preferences to 
themselves (i.e., they believe everyone has the same utility function as themselves). For example, 
there is a large literature in psychology (and recently economics) showing that individuals 
demonstrate a false consensus bias, which implies that, even when actual preferences are 
heterogeneous, individuals may not realize this and they may be considering a relatively 
homogeneous environment.28 Therefore, we predict that a participant that has an elasticity of 
marginal utility smaller than or equal to 
1𝑛𝑛 increases their donations as 𝑤𝑤 increases, and a participant 
that has an elasticity of marginal utility larger than 
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 decreases their donations as 𝑤𝑤 increases. 
Note, however, that, the elasticity coefficients of individuals are not directly observable. We use a 
risk elicitation task to approximate these coefficients, since our elasticity condition capturing the 
curvature of consumption utility corresponds to the relative risk aversion coefficient in an 
environment that involves risk.  
We used a series of 15 binary lottery choices, as shown in Table 2, to elicit individuals’ 
coefficients of risk aversion (also see Section 4 for additional details). The coefficient of risk 
aversion is determined by the number of safe choices. Assuming a CRRA utility function, an 
individual with seven or more safe choices is risk averse. For example, seven safe choices 
corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient 𝜃𝜃 between 0.26 and 0.50, and eight corresponds 
to a relative risk aversion coefficient 𝜃𝜃 between 0.50 and 0.74. An individual who makes six safe 
choices is either slightly risk averse or risk neutral. An individual who makes five safe choices is 
either risk neutral or slightly risk loving. An individual with less than five safe choices is risk 
loving.  
It is important to highlight that we do not expect elicited risk aversion coefficients to be a 
perfect measure of the elasticity parameters and, therefore, we treat these coefficients as 
                                               
27 When the parameters of our experiment are used, 
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 varies between 0.33 and 0.67. Therefore, if 𝜃𝜃 > 0.67, then 
giving is a strictly decreasing function of 𝑤𝑤. If 0.33 < 𝜃𝜃 < 0.67, then giving may sometimes increase and sometimes 
decrease depending on the parameters (see Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C). 
28 See Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Charness and Grosskopf (2001) for a review of this literature. 
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approximations.29 Below we provide Hypotheses 4 and 5 that approximate our theoretical 
predictions: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Individual giving increases as 𝑤𝑤 increases for participants who choose less than 
seven safe choices in the risk elicitation task. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Individual giving decreases as 𝑤𝑤 increases for participants who choose more than 
seven safe choices in the risk elicitation task. 
 
By conducting an experiment with real donations, we have the needed controls to test our 
hypotheses and examine the net effects of changing the tax rate and the degree of waste on 
charitable donations. 
 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The data come from an experiment conducted at the University of Michigan from August-
November 2015. A total of 204 students were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). 
There were 12 sessions in total. Each session lasted one hour and fifteen minutes, on average, and 
had either 12 or 18 participants. The experiment proceeded in four parts and it was programmed 
using z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The currency used in all parts of the experiment was 
US dollars. Upon completion of the experiment, earnings from all parts of the experiment were 
added to a show-up payment of $5. Participants received their payments in private and in cash, 
ranging from $15.50 to $57.75. 
At the beginning of each part of the experiment, all participants were given written 
instructions (see Appendix B), and an experimenter read the instructions aloud. In part 1, 
participants took a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 multiple-choice questions. The 
questions were drawn from a Graduate Record Examination (GRE) test preparation book (Seltzer, 
2009). All were of moderate-to-high difficulty. Participants were told that they would gain one 
point for each correct answer and zero for an incorrect answer. Participants were also informed 
that, upon completion of part 1, they would receive earnings which might depend on their relative 
performance in the test.30 
                                               
29 The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption may not be captured by the estimated relative risk 
aversion coefficient from the lottery task if agents are not expected utility maximizers or if the risk elicitation task 
used in the study does not correctly capture risk preferences. Nevertheless, in the absence of a better tool to capture 
the elasticity coefficient, approximating the curvature of the consumption utility based on our risk elicitation task 
allows us to test the model in a stronger fashion. Since, in our experiment, donation decisions and risk elicitation tasks 
are performed under very similar conditions (including payoff levels for a given subject), it is not unreasonable for 
the behavior in the risk elicitation task to shed light on subjects’ behavior regarding donation decisions. 
30 Specifically, participants were told that the amount earned “may be the same for everyone in this room, or each 
participant’s earnings may depend on their relative performance in the test.” We used this language to facilitate 
comparison between our two treatments: Equal versus Unequal. In addition, before the experiment started, subjects 
were told that they may lose part of the money they earn in part 1. They received explicit instructions for part 2 after 
they finished part 1 (see Appendix B). 
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In part 2, participants were randomly and anonymously matched into groups consisting of 
3 participants. We chose 𝑛𝑛 = 3 for two important reasons. First, it allows us to minimize 
mistakes/errors of participants by creating the simplest possible environment for them while still 
keeping the environment rich enough to incorporate all the important factors that might influence 
their behavior. Second, it provides a strong test for the theory. For small values of 𝑛𝑛, the model 
makes different predictions depending on the elasticity of marginal utility.  
Each group was randomly assigned to a different charity.31 Participants in a given group 
could simultaneously donate any amount to this charity, ranging from $0 to the amount earned in 
part 1, in increments of 5 cents. In the Equal treatment, all members of the group received $30. In 
the Unequal treatment, participants who scored the highest in part 1 received $45, participants in 
the middle received $30, and participants who scored the lowest received $15. Note that the total 
amount of income is fixed across Equal and Unequal treatments ($30 + $30 + $30 versus $45 + 
$30 + $15). While the Equal treatment provides a simple environment to test our predictions, the 
Unequal treatment provides a relatively more realistic set-up. It is important to stress that the focus 
of our study is the effect of changing the tax rates and degrees of waste on giving, but we are also 
able to study how income inequality affects giving decisions (keeping the rate of tax and waste 
constant). 
Participants were asked to make 10 donation decisions at once under different 
combinations of the tax rate and the redistribution rate (𝑟𝑟 = 1 −𝑤𝑤), as shown in Table 1. To avoid 
negative framing, we did not use the word “waste” in the experimental instructions. Participants 
were told that, at the end of the experiment, the computer would randomly implement one decision 
for payment, applying the appropriate tax and redistribution rates to compute the participant’s 
payout. After the experiment, the experimenters sent a check to each charity for the total amount 
donated to that charity in that randomly determined decision.32 
Participants knew that we would apply a tax (which was either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on 
each participant’s remaining income and collect the corresponding amount of money. They also 
knew that we would evenly redistribute a share of the collected money among the participants 
within the same group, while the rest of the collected money (which was either 0%, 50%, or 100%) 
would be returned back to the experimenter.33 After learning their initial income, all participants 
made their donations simultaneously and anonymously.34 All ten donation situations were 
presented on the same screen. Given that we are primarily interested in the changes in donations 
as a response to the changing tax and waste rates (as opposed to the absolute donation amounts), 
                                               
31 We used the following charities: American Cancer Society, American Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, Feeding 
America, Food for the Poor, and Save the Children. 
32 Participants were told that, if requested, they would receive a confirmation email from the charity to verify that the 
experimenters sent their donations to the charity.  
33 As an alternative design, we could have used the collected money to fund a cause that would be perceived as wasteful 
by most subjects. Due to the difficulty of identifying a cause that would simultaneously be perceived as wasteful by 
subjects, while also not being a waste of limited research funds, we chose to avoid this alternative design. 
34 Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C give theoretical predictions of giving for each t and w assuming specific utility 
functions. 
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we made the changes as obvious as possible to the subjects. The subjects were free to make 
decisions in any order and revise their decisions before submitting them. 
To minimize calculation mistakes, participants were provided with a pre-programmed 
“calculator”. A participant could enter the tax rate, redistribution rate and the potential donation 
decisions by themselves and the other participants in their group. The calculator would then show 
the group donation, pre-tax income, tax payment, after-tax income, redistribution amount and the 
final income of the participant. Participants could use the calculator as many times as they liked. 
In part 3, we elicited participants’ risk preferences (which we use as an approximation for 
their elasticity of marginal utility). Over a series of 15 binary choices, as shown in Table 2, 
participants were asked to choose between a risky option A ($9.0 or $1.0 with 50% chance each) 
and a safe option B (increasing monotonically from $0.5 to $7.5 in increments of $0.50). One of 
the 15 choices was randomly selected to be paid out at the end of the experiment. The parameters 
in this task were carefully designed to elicit a wide range of risk preferences.  
In part 4, we elicited social preferences. Each participant was randomly matched with 
another participant. Participants were asked to choose one of the four options ($2.00; $2.00), 
($1.75; $3.00), ($2.25; $1.00) and ($2.00; $1.75), where the first entry corresponds to their own 
payoff and the second entry corresponds to their paired participant’s payoff. After both participants 
made their decisions, the computer randomly determined whose decision to implement, and the 
earnings of both participants were determined accordingly. 
At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire. After the 
computer displayed outcomes from all parts of the experiment and calculated individual earnings, 
participants received their payments in private. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 shows the average donation and the fraction of participants giving $0 for different 
levels of tax and waste for both the equal and unequal income distributions. The left panel 
corresponds to the Equal treatment in which all participants received $30 and could donate part of 
this income to a charity. The right panel corresponds to the Unequal treatment in which participants 
received either $45, $30, or $15 (as determined by their relative performance in part 1).35 Note 
that, unless otherwise mentioned, we only consider the case of 𝑡𝑡 > 0%, since when 𝑡𝑡 = 0%, waste 
is no longer a consideration for participants (i.e., 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑁𝑁/𝐴𝐴). 
We begin by examining how giving changes when 𝑡𝑡 changes. In the Equal treatment, when 
there is no waste (𝑤𝑤 = 0%), giving slightly increases from $3.97 when 𝑡𝑡 = 25% to $4.06 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50%, and increases to $4.18 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75%. None of these differences are significant based 
on pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, however. Looking at the effect of higher taxes on giving 
at 𝑤𝑤 = 50% and 𝑤𝑤 = 100%, we first see a decrease in giving and then an increase. While the first 
decrease at 𝑤𝑤 = 50% is significant at the 1% significance level, none of the other cases are 
                                               
35 Seven participants (3 in the Equal and 4 in the Unequal treatment) received a score of zero in part 1. These subjects 
might have failed to submit their answers on time or simply chose not to work on the task. Our results are robust to 
inclusion or exclusion of these 7 participants and are available upon request from the authors.  
17 
 
significant at the 5% significance level. Pooling across all levels of waste, the left panel of Figure 
1 shows no significant relationship between average giving and the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 in the Equal treatment 
(none of the three pair-wise comparisons are significant at the 5% significance level).  
Similar responses to changes in the tax rate are observed when examining the Unequal 
treatment. When there is no waste (i.e., 𝑤𝑤 = 0%), giving slightly increases from $4.75 when 𝑡𝑡 = 
25%, to $4.90 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50% (p-value = 0.56), and decreases to $4.57 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75% (p-value = 
0.03). Similarly, for 𝑤𝑤 = 50%, there is no monotonic relationship between the tax rate and giving. 
These differences are not significant based on pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For 𝑤𝑤 = 
100%, giving increases when the tax rate changes from 25% to 50%, and from 50% to 75%, but 
none of these increases are statistically significant. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the line 
representing the relationship between the average donation and the tax rate in the Unequal 
treatment is virtually flat, suggesting no significant correlation (none of the three pair-wise 
comparisons are significant at conventional statistical levels). 
Next, we examine how giving changes with 𝑤𝑤. In the Equal treatment, when the degree of 
waste increases from 𝑤𝑤 = 0% to 𝑤𝑤 = 50%, giving significantly decreases from $3.97 to $3.02 
when 𝑡𝑡 = 25% (p-value < 0.01), from $4.06 to $2.53 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50% (p-value < 0.01), and from 
$4.18 to $2.85 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75% (p-value < 0.01). When the degree of waste increases from 𝑤𝑤 = 
50% to 𝑤𝑤 = 100%, giving further decreases from $3.02 to $2.06 when 𝑡𝑡 = 25% (p-value < 0.01), 
from $2.53 to $2.04 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50% (p-value < 0.01), and from $2.85 to $2.58 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75% (p-
value = 0.06). Pooling across all tax rates, the left panel of Figure 2 shows a clear negative and 
significant relationship between average giving and the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 in the Equal treatment 
(all three pair-wise comparisons are significant at the 1% significance level). 
A similar response to changes in waste is observed when examining the Unequal treatment. 
When the degree of waste increases from 𝑤𝑤 = 0% to 𝑤𝑤 = 50%, giving significantly decreases 
from $4.75 to $3.58 when 𝑡𝑡 = 25% (p-value < 0.01), from $4.90 to $3.67 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50% (p-value 
< 0.01), and from $4.57 to $3.48 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75% (p-value < 0.01). When the degree of waste 
increases from 𝑤𝑤 = 50% to 𝑤𝑤 = 100%, giving further decreases from $3.58 to $2.83 when 𝑡𝑡 = 
25% (p-value < 0.01) and from $3.67 to $2.85 when 𝑡𝑡 = 50% (p-value < 0.01), but it increases 
(although not significantly) from $3.48 to $4.25 when 𝑡𝑡 = 75% (p-value = 0.12). The right panel 
of Figure 2 shows that there is a clear negative and significant relationship between average giving 
and the degree of waste in the Unequal treatment (all three pair-wise comparisons are significant 
at the 1% significance level). 
We now supplement the above nonparametric analysis with a series of regression analyses. 
Table 4 reports Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered at the participant level.36 The 
dependent variable is giving. Regression (1) uses the data from the Equal treatment, and the 
independent variables are the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 and the rate of waste 𝑤𝑤. Consistent with the non-parametric 
tests, the coefficient on 𝑡𝑡 is not significant (p-value = 0.68). Also, consistent with the non-
parametric tests, the coefficient on 𝑤𝑤 is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01), confirming that 
                                               
36 We choose to present Tobit regression analyses in the main text, since roughly half of the participants gave $0. Our 
qualitative results are robust to using OLS regressions (see Appendix D). 
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giving decreases in the degree of waste. Regression (2) uses the data from the Unequal treatment, 
and the independent variables are the tax rate 𝑡𝑡, the rate of waste 𝑤𝑤, and Income (to control for the 
different income levels that participants earned in part 1 of the experiment). As in the Equal 
treatment (regression 1), the coefficient on 𝑡𝑡 is not significant (p-value = 0.96). Also, as in the 
Equal treatment, the coefficient on 𝑤𝑤 is negative and highly significant (p-value < 0.01). Pooling 
the data from both treatments, as shown in regression (3), corroborates this result. Note that 
regressions (1)-(3) only consider data for 𝑡𝑡 > 0% (since 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑁𝑁/𝐴𝐴 for 𝑡𝑡 = 0%). Alternatively, we 
can impose an assumption that 𝑤𝑤 = 0% when 𝑡𝑡 = 0%. While this assumption is restrictive and 
may not accurately describe how participants perceive the case of 𝑡𝑡 = 0%, as a robustness check, 
we redid our analysis by imposing this assumption. Our results do not change (see regressions (4)-
(6) in Table 4). The only difference is that the coefficient of the tax rate is now positive, but it 
remains statistically insignificant. We provide additional robustness checks in Appendix D (see 
Tables D1-D4).37 
Given our analysis, we can conclude that our data are consistent with Hypothesis 3, but not 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Both nonparametric tests and regression analysis fail to find a 
significant effect of the tax rate on giving. In contrast, we see a large and statistically significant 
negative effect of the degree of waste on donations in both nonparametric tests and regression 
analysis.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2, which states that the marginal effect of the tax rate on giving 
is greater than the marginal effect of the degree of waste on giving, we compare the coefficients 
on the tax rate and the rate of waste. Recall that, while the coefficient on the tax rate is not 
significantly different from zero, the coefficient on the rate of waste is negative and significant. 
Wald tests, formally testing Hypothesis 2, show that the coefficient on 𝑡𝑡 is significantly larger than 
the coefficient on 𝑤𝑤 in all regressions (p-values in all of the tests are less than 0.01). We summarize 
our findings in Results 1-3: 
 
Result 1: In contrast to Hypothesis 1, giving does not change when the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 increases. 
 
Result 2: Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the marginal effect of the tax rate on giving is 
significantly larger than the marginal effect of the degree of waste.  
 
Result 3: Consistent with Hypothesis 3, giving significantly decreases when the degree of 
waste 𝑤𝑤 increases. 
 
Recall that our experimental design also gives us an opportunity to see how initial income 
inequality affects the level of contributions. We find that the coefficient of the dummy variable 
Unequal is not significant, suggesting that initial income distribution does not matter for giving 
decisions (see regressions (3) and (6) in Table 4). We get a similar result when performing non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to compare giving between equal and unequal income 
                                               
37 Appendix D also provides an analysis of heterogeneity among individuals. 
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distributions at each tax and waste level—p-values for all pairwise comparisons range between 
0.20 and 0.77. This finding is consistent with the neutrality result of Bergstrom et al. (1986), which 
states that total public goods provision does not change with initial income inequality.38 It is 
important to note, however, that while the theory makes correct qualitative predictions at the 
aggregate level, it does not predict the levels of individual giving. While the model predicts that 
the high income individuals (who received $45) should contribute more than the middle income 
individuals (who received $30) and the middle income individuals should contribute more than 
the low income individuals (who received $15), our regression analyses show that this does not 
hold in the data. Although the Income coefficient in regressions (2) and (3) is positive, it is not 
significant (also see Tables D2-D3 in Appendix D). In addition, when we run Tobit and OLS 
regressions with dummies for high and low income, none of our results change (see Tables D5-D6 
in Appendix D). The insignificant effect of income on giving may not be surprising given that 
several other studies also find that high income individuals often under-contribute, while low 
income individuals often over-contribute relative to predicted levels (e.g., Chan et al., 1996, 1999; 
Uler, 2011; Maurice et al., 2013). 
Next, we test Hypotheses 4 and 5. Recall that one of the theoretical predictions of our 
model is that the relationship between giving and the degree of waste depends on the curvature of 
subjects’ utility functions with respect to consumption (or, more formally, the elasticity of 
marginal utility). The relationship between giving and the tax rate also changes sign depending on 
the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, but only for extremely high elasticity 
parameters (which are unlikely to be observed in practice). Recall that we used a risk elicitation 
task in order to approximate individual elasticity parameters.  
We find that the average number of safe choices in the risk elicitation task is 7.20, with a 
standard deviation of 1.84. Hypothesis 4 states that individuals who choose less than seven safe 
choices will—on average—increase their giving as the degree of waste increases. Hypothesis 5 
states that individuals who choose more than seven safe choices will—on average—decrease their 
giving as the degree of waste increases. 
Table 5 reports the same regressions as in Table 4, but considering only participants with 
more than 7 safe choices in regressions (1)-(3), and less than seven safe choices in regressions (4)-
(6).39 Regressions (1)-(3) show that subjects with more than seven safe choices decrease their 
giving in the rate of waste 𝑤𝑤.40 Regressions (4)-(6) show that the magnitude and the significance 
of this relationship are greatly reduced when we consider subjects with less than seven safe 
                                               
38 The neutrality result relies on the assumption that the set of contributors stays the same as income inequality 
increases. Otherwise, Bergstrom et al. (1986), as well as our model, predict that total giving increases as initial income 
inequality increases. Therefore, a stronger test of neutrality result requires to have a within-subject variation of income 
(see Duquette and Hargaden, 2019), but since this is not the main aim of the paper, our research design does not 
incorporate such variation. 
39 One participant in our experiment has missing data after part 2 due to health reasons. Therefore, when we add 
variables from parts 3 and 4 and the questionnaires to the regression analysis, this participant gets automatically 
dropped from the regression analysis. 
40 The negative impact of w on giving is robust to including the subjects with seven safe choices.  
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choices. These results are not consistent with Hypothesis 4, but they are consistent with Hypothesis 
5.41 In Appendix D, we provide additional robustness checks (see Table D7).  
 
Result 4: In contrast to Hypothesis 4, giving does not increase as the degree of waste 
increases for subjects who have a small elasticity of marginal utility (i.e., those that pick less than 
seven safe choices in a risk elicitation task). 
 
Result 5: Consistent with Hypothesis 5, giving decreases as the degree of waste increases 
for subjects who have a relatively large elasticity of marginal utility (i.e., those that pick more than 
seven safe choices in a risk elicitation task). 
 
While we fail to find support for Hypothesis 4, it is important to note that the negative 
relationship between 𝑤𝑤 and giving completely disappears in regressions (5) and (6). This provides 
moderate support for the model, showing that curvature of the consumption utility affects the 
relationship between 𝑤𝑤 and giving.  
Finally, we show that our results are robust to including other covariates. Table 6 reports 
Tobit regressions, in which the dependent variable is giving. For comparison purposes, regression 
(1) in Table 6 is the same as regression (3) in Table 4. Regression (2) in Table 6 uses two additional 
explanatory variables, Egalitarian and Generous. Egalitarian is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 if a subject picked the fair option in part 4, and Generous is a dummy variable that takes value 1 
if a subject picked the welfare maximizing option in part 4. Note that the estimated coefficients on 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑡𝑡 in regression (2) are fairly similar to those in regression (1). In addition, we find that 
participants who are classified as Generous give more to charity (p-value < 0.01). Regression (3) 
adds other variables that were elicited at the end of the experiment using a survey. The positive 
and significant coefficient on Female suggests that, on average, women give more than men (p-
value < 0.01). Finally, regression (4) adds an additional control for the participant’s score in part 
1. Importantly, none of these controls change our main qualitative results. Table D8 in Appendix 
D confirms similar results using OLS regressions. 
 
Result 6: Our results are robust to inclusion of control variables. 
 
6. An Additional Experiment for Robustness Check 
An important question is why we do not see a positive relationship between the tax rate 
and charitable giving as predicted by our model. Perhaps we fail to find support for our hypothesis 
because we did not give our subjects an opportunity to learn. In this section, we test this possibility 
                                               
41 As a robustness check (not shown here for brevity), we have repeated our analysis by eliminating the 14 subjects 
that made less than six safe choices. Our qualitative results do not change. 
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with an additional experiment and show that our results are robust to learning through repeated 
play and feedback.42 
We conducted an additional experiment with 90 new subjects during October 2019. This 
additional experiment also took place at the University of Michigan and consisted of five sessions. 
Each session lasted approximately one and a half hours and had 18 participants. Subjects were 
randomly divided into groups of three and the composition of the groups stayed the same 
throughout the sessions.  
Both the design and the instructions for this additional experiment deviated as little as 
possible from those utilized in the original study (see Appendix B for the instructions). The main 
differences can be summarized in three points: (i) in order to give subjects an opportunity to learn 
and respond to the tax rate, the additional experiment focused only on changing the tax rate while 
keeping the rate of waste constant at 50%, (ii) subjects played 15 rounds of the game, with each 
tax rate (25%, 50% or 75%) randomly repeating five times, and (iii) after subjects simultaneously 
and anonymously entered their charitable giving decisions for a given round, they were provided 
with feedback (i.e., subjects were informed of the total amount of donations made to the assigned 
charity by their own group, as well as their pre-tax income, tax payment, after-tax income, 
redistribution amount and final income). Similar to the original experiment, only one decision was 
randomly selected and implemented at the end of the experiment. 
Since in the additional experiment subjects made donation decisions one round at a time 
and feedback was provided between each round, the order in which different tax rates appeared 
could have affected behavior. We controlled for possible order effects by using the following 
mechanism: For each group, one of the possible tax rates was randomly selected for round one. 
Then, for the second round, a tax rate was randomly selected from the two remaining unused tax 
rates, and the other tax rate then appeared in round three. This process repeated itself four more 
times to determine the tax rate for rounds 4-15. This mechanism allowed each group to face a 
random sequence of tax rates, such that each tax rate appeared five times and different tax rates 
were distributed evenly over rounds.43  
Table 7 shows, for a given tax rate: the mean donation, standard error and proportion of 
zero-donations, first calculated using the individual donations data from all 15 rounds, then using 
only the first three or only the last three rounds. Consistent with our previous finding, we do not 
see a positive effect of the tax rate on donations. If anything, the effect seems to be negative (when 
considering the first three or all rounds). When we look at the last three rounds, where subjects are 
the most experienced with the game, there does not appear to be a monotonic relationship between 
the tax rate and donations. In addition, Figure 3, which shows average donations over the five 
repetitions for each tax rate, similarly confirms the lack of a positive relationship. 
                                               
42 We thank Charles Noussair, who suggested that studying repeated decisions with feedback is essential to 
understanding whether the failure of donations to respond to the tax rate is a transitory phenomenon that would go 
away with better comprehension of the task or whether it is a durable and solid pattern of behavior. 
43 Hence, we can effectively control for order effects and guarantee that the level of experience and different tax rates 
cannot be correlated. 
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In order to test whether the differences in donations across tax rates are statistically 
significant, we conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. We use data averaged at the group level as 
our independent observations.44 Table 8 shows the results. There is no evidence that donations 
significantly change as the tax rate changes when we consider all 15 rounds, the first three rounds 
or the last three rounds. In other words, our results from the additional experiment support our 
conclusions from the original experiment.  
We provide further support by conducting a regression analysis (see Table 9). Regressions 
(1) and (2) of Table 9 report Tobit regressions with and without controls, respectively. Regressions 
(3) and (4) repeat the analysis in regressions (1) and (2) using OLS. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the group level. All specifications show that contributions decline over rounds, which 
is a common result in public goods experiments. More importantly, donations do not increase 
either with the tax rate or income. These results are consistent with our findings in Section 5.  
 
Result 7: We fail to find a significant impact of the tax rate on giving, even when subjects 
have an opportunity to learn through repetition and feedback. 
 
7. Discussions and Conclusion 
We provide a theoretical model and conduct a laboratory experiment to study how tax rates 
and waste impact individual giving.45 Our model demonstrates that the tax rate and the rate of 
waste create different effects on prices (the opportunity cost of giving). The effect of an increase 
in the tax rate on the price of giving is stronger than the effect of an increase in the rate of waste 
on the price of giving. We show that the model predicts that the marginal effect of the tax rate on 
giving is greater than the marginal effect of the degree of waste on giving. The theory shows that, 
while the relationship between charitable giving and the tax rate is positive, donations may increase 
or decrease when the rate of government waste increases (depending on the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to consumption). Our experiment provides strong qualitative support for the 
model regarding the differential effects of the tax rate and waste on donations. The data show that 
changes in the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 have a weak and insignificant effect on giving. This finding is robust even 
when subjects have an opportunity to learn through repetition and feedback as shown by our 
additional experiment. We also find that the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 has a large, negative and highly 
significant effect on giving. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the relationship between 
giving and 𝑤𝑤 changes across low and high levels of elasticity of marginal utility.  
One might question why we fail to find support for Hypothesis 1 even though both 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are consistent with the data. There are several competing explanations for this. 
First, it is possible that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption is greater than 
one. Second, subjects may not be willing to reduce the resources to be shared with their group 
members, even when the price of giving to charity decreases (as the tax rate increases). Third, the 
                                               
44 Note that there are 30 independent groups. 
45 To isolate the effects of tax and waste on donations, our paper focuses on the demand side of giving. A related 
literature studies the factors that affect the supply side (e.g., Krasteva and Yildirim, 2016). Future research could 
incorporate how the supply side might also be affected from changes in the tax rate and the rate of waste.  
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negative income effect may be more salient than the positive substitution effect. Fourth, 
participants may harbor negative emotions towards taxation, such as anger and distrust, since the 
money they earned is being “wasted”, which may then lead to lower altruism towards charitable 
causes.  
It is possible to rule out the first explanation, as very few subjects seem to have an elasticity 
of marginal utility higher than one (approximated by their coefficient of relative risk aversion). 
The second explanation can also be ruled out, since we do not find a statistically significant 
increase in giving even when the rate of waste is constant at 100%.46 But we cannot rule out the 
third and fourth explanations.47 It is possible that the saliency of income loss and negative emotions 
due to waste create behavioral biases that cancel out the positive effect predicted by the model and 
Hypothesis 1. The same reasoning can be used to explain why Hypothesis 4 is not supported. In 
addition, these explanations imply that the negative effect of increasing the degree of waste might 
be even stronger than suggested by our model. 
Our findings have important policy implications. In a controlled environment, we show 
that the tax rate does not have a significant effect on charitable donations. This suggests that 
charities should not scale down their fundraising efforts when there is an increase in the tax rate 
and the government should not rely on increasing the tax rate as an effective policy to increase 
charitable donations. In addition, since our results imply that the average effect of “waste” on 
donations is negative in large economies, we conjecture that policies increasing the efficiency with 
which tax revenue is used are likely to increase charitable donations. Moreover, donations are 
likely to increase if individuals perceive tax revenue to be spent on services they value rather than 
things they do not care for. Silverman et al. (2014) argue that individuals evade taxes less if they 
are given a satisfying explanation for being taxed. Similarly, our findings suggest that it might be 
worthwhile to make an effort to convince individuals that their taxes are being used efficiently and 
that there are large benefits of publicly provided public goods to the society as a whole. Finally, 
our results imply that empirical studies estimating price and income elasticities of giving would 
benefit from controlling for the confounding effect of perceptions about wasteful government 
spending, since perceptions regarding waste might exogenously or endogenously change over 
time. 
 
  
                                               
46 For each income distribution, we have run regressions (both Tobit and OLS) to study whether the impact of tax rate 
on donations is statistically significant when 𝑤𝑤 = 1. None of the regressions show a statistically significant effect of 
tax rate on donations at a 5% significance level. When the data from different income distributions are pooled, then a 
significant impact can be seen when using an OLS regression (p-value = 0.04), but not when using a Tobit regression 
(p-value = 0.79). 
47 Our experiment was not designed to differentiate between these alternative explanations. Future research could 
address this research question. 
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Table 1: Donation decisions in the experiment 
Decision line Tax rate, 𝑡𝑡  Waste, 𝑤𝑤 
1 0% N/A 
2 25% 0% 
3 50% 0% 
4 75% 0% 
5 25% 50% 
6 50% 50% 
7 75% 50% 
8 25% 100% 
9 50% 100% 
10 75% 100% 
Participants choose how much to donate given the tax rate and the waste rate. Note that, in the experiment, 
to prevent negative framing, the rate of waste was presented as the “redistribution rate” (i.e., 1 − 𝑤𝑤). 
 
Table 2: Elicitation of risk preferences 
Decision 
Line 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $0.50 for sure  
2 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $1.00 for sure  
3 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $1.50 for sure  
4 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $2.00 for sure  
5 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $2.50 for sure 
 6 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $3.00 for sure 
7 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $3.50 for sure  
8 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $4.00 for sure  
9 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $4.50 for sure  
10 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $5.00 for sure 
 11 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $5.50 for sure 
12 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $6.00 for sure  
13 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $6.50 for sure  
14 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $7.00 for sure  
15 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $7.50 for sure  
 
Table 3: Individual giving by treatment 
Treatment Equal Unequal 
Tax rate, 𝑡𝑡 Waste, 𝑤𝑤 Average giving Fraction of $0 Average giving Fraction of $0 
0% N/A $3.69 (0.52) 0.50 $3.83 (0.64) 0.50 
25% 0% $3.97 (0.57) 0.46 $4.75 (0.65) 0.39 
50% 0% $4.06 (0.55) 0.44 $4.90 (0.66) 0.39 
75% 0% $4.18 (0.59) 0.46 $4.57 (0.66) 0.39 
25% 50% $3.02 (0.44) 0.47 $3.58 (0.51) 0.43 
50% 50% $2.53 (0.39) 0.50 $3.67 (0.60) 0.46 
75% 50% $2.85 (0.54) 0.52 $3.48 (0.61) 0.50 
25% 100% $2.06 (0.38) 0.61 $2.83 (0.54) 0.56 
50% 100% $2.04 (0.45) 0.67 $2.85 (0.58) 0.58 
75% 100% $2.58 (0.60) 0.70 $4.25 (0.93) 0.61 
 Standard error of the mean is in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Tobit regression of giving 
 For 𝑡𝑡 > 0% For all 𝑡𝑡 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  -0.46 -0.07 -0.27 0.34 1.46 0.94 
  [tax rate] (1.11) (1.23) (0.85) (1.09) (1.20) (0.83) 𝑤𝑤  -4.26*** -3.92*** -4.13*** -4.06*** -3.56*** -3.83*** 
  [degree of waste] (1.05) (1.12) (0.79) (0.95) (0.97) (0.70) 
Income  0.02 0.03  0.02 0.03 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Unequal   1.66   1.52 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.33)   (1.31) 
Constant 1.47 0.95 -0.30 0.91 -0.31 -1.24 
  [constant term] (1.22) (2.49) (2.79) (1.11) (2.46) (2.77) 
Observations 810 1026 1836 900 1140 2040 
Clusters 90 114 204 90 114 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the participant level. 
 
 
Table 5: Giving and the curvature of the utility function 
 More than 7 safe choices Less than 7 safe choices  
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  0 -1.33 -0.78 -0.29 4.00 1.85 
  [tax rate] (1.43) (1.16) (0.90) (1.90) (2.76) (1.77) 𝑤𝑤  -4.25** -5.39** -4.92*** -2.46* -1.56 -2.09 
  [degree of waste] (1.42) (1.99) (1.33) (1.16) (1.91) (1.15) 
Income  -0.08 -0.07  -0.10 -0.07 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Unequal   0.04   3.06 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.98)   (2.16) 
Constant 2 5.3 4.75 -0.20 0.92 -0.87 
  [constant term] (1.84) (2.78) (3.83) (2.03) (4.46) (4.41) 
Observations 333 450 783 351 351 702 
Clusters 37 50 87 39 39 78 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table 6: The determinants of giving 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) 𝑡𝑡  -0.27 -0.33 -0.25 -0.27 
  [tax rate] (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.86) 𝑤𝑤  -4.13*** -4.14*** -4.08*** -4.16*** 
  [degree of waste] (0.79) (0.79) (0.76) (0.78) 
Income 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Unequal 1.66 1.60 1.83 1.43 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment] (1.33) (1.27) (1.17) (1.16) 
Egalitarian   2.76 1.81 1.83 
  [1 if ($2.00; $2.00)]  (1.82) (1.68) (1.70) 
Generous   7.71** 7.92** 7.86** 
  [1 if ($1.75; $3.00)]  (2.78) (2.41) (2.45) 
Hardwork    -0.53 -0.52 
  [how hard you worked in part 1]   (0.28) (0.27) 
Female    3.89** 3.89** 
  [1 if female]   (1.41) (1.40) 
Family income   0.13 0.22 
  [family income]   (0.32) (0.32) 
Right-wing   0.78 0.71 
  [right-wing political view]   (0.54) (0.56) 
Unnecessary   -3.63 -3.04 
  [1 if taxes are annoying and unnecessary]   (2.27) (2.30) 
Necessary   0.13 1.53 
  [1 if taxes are necessary and do not bother]   (2.60) (2.68) 
Reputation   0.01 -0.11 
  [importance of own reputation]   (0.39) (0.40) 
Church   0.72 0.61 
  [giving to church]   (0.39) (0.39) 
Charity   0.44 0.5 
  [giving to charities]   (0.50) (0.51) 
Familiar    0.30 0.28 
  [knowledge of charity]   (0.24) (0.24) 
American   -0.41 -0.34 
  [1 if a United States citizen]   (1.56) (1.58) 
Part 1     0.13 
  [part 1 score]    (0.35) 
Constant -0.30 -1.84 -7.43 -7.45 
  [constant term] (2.79) (3.06) (5.46) (5.40) 
Observations 1836 1827 1827 1764 
Clusters 204 203 203 196 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table 7: Giving – Robustness Check 
 All 15 rounds First three Last three 
Tax rate, 𝑡𝑡 Average giving Fraction of $0 Average giving Fraction of $0 Average giving Fraction of $0 
25% $3.18 (0.22) 0.63 $4.12 (0.53) 0.70 $2.50 (0.47)  0.56 
50% $2.95 (0.19) 0.63 $3.73 (0.47) 0.68 $2.55 (0.44) 0.56 
75% $2.93 (0.22) 0.56 $3.62 (0.55) 0.61 $2.50 (0.44) 0.49 
N 450 450 90 90 90 90 
Standard error of the mean is in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests 
 All 15 rounds First three Last three 
25% vs 50% 0.24 0.30 0.82 
50% vs 75% 0.92 0.09 0.87 
25% vs 75% 0.80 0.23 0.87 
Note: For each test, sample size is 30 (i.e., there are 30 independent pairs). 
 
 
 
Table 9: Regression Analysis 
                 Tobit                                                       OLS 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2)  (3) (4) 𝑡𝑡  -1.34 -1.29  -0.51 -0.52 
  [tax rate] (1.05) (1.04)  (0.71) (0.73) 
Income 0.05 0.05  0.04 0.04 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.05) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.04) 
Round -0.16*** -0.17***  -0.10*** -0.10*** 
  [round = 1,…,15] (0.04) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 1.59 0.72  2.72** 2.45 
  [constant term] (1.42) (4.37)  (0.84) (2.47) 
Controls Added No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 1350 1335  1350 1335 
Clusters 30 30  30 30 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the group level. Data for one subject is automatically dropped from the 
analysis when controls are included in regressions (2) and (4), since this subject did not fill in the 
questionnaire. 
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Figure 1: Average giving in response to changes in 𝒕𝒕 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average giving in response to changes in 𝒘𝒘 
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Figure 3: Average giving over repetitions 
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Appendix 
(For Online Publication) 
 
Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3 
We start by writing the maximization problem of an agent 𝑖𝑖: 
max𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) + 𝑣𝑣(𝐺𝐺)  
s.t. 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡)(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤𝑤) 𝑡𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗−𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛  and 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is 𝑢𝑢′ �(1 − 𝑡𝑡)(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤𝑤) 𝑡𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗−𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛 � �1 − �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 � 𝑡𝑡� = 𝑣𝑣′(𝐺𝐺). 
Since this equation holds for all agents, in equilibrium, the following should hold: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 − 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 = 𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 . 
Therefore, the FOC simplifies to: 𝑢𝑢′ �(1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 ���1 − �1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 � 𝑡𝑡� = 𝑣𝑣′(𝐺𝐺). 
 
Proof for Theorem 1: Totally differentiating the FOC with respect to the tax rate 𝑡𝑡, and 
then solving for 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 , we get 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 = − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)+𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣′′(𝐺𝐺)+𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�1−𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) , 
where 𝑎𝑎 = 1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛  and 𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �. Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑡𝑡.  
 If 𝑤𝑤 = 0, the numerator simplifies to 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎 and it is easy to see that it is always positive 
and, therefore, we do not need any additional assumptions about the consumption utility.  
Now assume 0 < 𝑤𝑤 < 1. Note that 𝑎𝑎 = 1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 = 𝑛𝑛−1+𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 > 𝑤𝑤. Hence,  𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎 >  
> 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤 =  
= 𝑤𝑤 �𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)�. 
Since (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) < (1 −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡), we can show that  𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎 >  𝑤𝑤�𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)�. 
This implies that if 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) is nonnegative, 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎 has to be 
positive. In other words, for the numerator to be positive, it is sufficient to have − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 1. 
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Finally, if 𝑤𝑤 = 1, total public goods provision is still a strictly increasing function of the 
tax rate if − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) < 1. For the extreme case of 𝑤𝑤 = 1 and − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) = 1, public goods provision 
does not change with the tax rate. 
 
Proof for Theorem 2: Totally differentiating the FOC with respect to the rate of waste, 
and then solving for 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤, we get 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 = − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)+𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣′′(𝐺𝐺)+𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�1−𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) , 
where 𝑎𝑎 = 1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛  and 𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �. 
We provide a proof by contradiction. Suppose 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 > 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 . We see that in order for 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 to be 
larger than 
𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡  , the following needs to hold: 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑎𝑎 < 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛. 
Rearranging, 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛) < 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑤𝑤). 
We can immediately see that if 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑤𝑤, then the previous inequality cannot hold. Instead, let’s 
assume 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑤𝑤. Rearranging one more time, we get 𝑎𝑎−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤−𝑡𝑡 < − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) . 
Note that 
𝑎𝑎−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤−𝑡𝑡 = (𝑛𝑛−1)+(𝑤𝑤−𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛(𝑤𝑤−𝑡𝑡) > 1, for any 𝑡𝑡 > 0. In addition, the following inequality holds: − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) < − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) . Together these imply 1 < − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) , which contradicts our initial 
assumption. Therefore, if − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) ≤ 1, then 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 > 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤. 
 
Proof for Theorem 3: Recall that 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 = − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡�𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)+𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏)𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣′′(𝐺𝐺)+𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)�1−𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 �(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) , 
where 𝑎𝑎 = 1 − 1−𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛  and 𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 �. Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺𝐺 with respect to 𝑤𝑤.  
When 𝑡𝑡 = 0, waste does not matter, so we consider 0 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1. Since (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) < (1 −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) 
and 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏) < 0, we get 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 >  
> 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 =  
= 𝑡𝑡 �𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 1𝑛𝑛�.  
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This implies that if 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 1𝑛𝑛 is nonnegative, then 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) +𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 > 0. Therefore, the condition needed is − 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥𝑢𝑢′(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 1𝑛𝑛. 
 
Proof for Theorem 4: Assume the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the 
CRRA utility function 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑥𝑥(1−𝜃𝜃)
(1−𝜃𝜃)  for 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢𝑢 = ln (𝑥𝑥) for 𝜃𝜃 = 1. Then the elasticity of 
marginal utility is given by 𝜃𝜃.  
We are looking for when donations strictly decrease as the degree of waste increases. In 
other words, we study when 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢′(𝑏𝑏) 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 < 0. Substituting 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑥𝑥(1−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)  in this 
previous equation, we get −𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏−𝜃𝜃−1𝑡𝑡 �𝑌𝑌−𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛 � (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝑏𝑏−𝜃𝜃 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 < 0. 
Rearranging, this equation simplifies to 𝜃𝜃 > (1 −𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛. 
It is important to note that 
(1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 > 1𝑛𝑛 when 𝑤𝑤 < 1, since (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡) < (1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡). When 𝑤𝑤 = 1, (1−𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛 = 1𝑛𝑛.  
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Appendix B: Instructions to the Experiment 
Instructions for the Unequal Treatment 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. Your participation is voluntary. In this experiment 
we want to see the choices that people make. You will be making choices on your own and in private. So it is very 
important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s choices. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand. 
The experiment will proceed in four parts. At the beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions 
for that part. The earnings that you make will depend on your decisions in each part. 
In Part 1, you will take a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 questions. Upon completion of Part 1 you 
will earn a certain amount of money. This amount may be the same for everyone in this room or each participant’s 
earnings may depend on their relative performance in the test. 
In Part 2, you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. Depending on your choices and 
chance, you may lose part of the money you earn in Part 1. Your decisions in Part 2 will not affect your earnings from 
Part 3 and Part 4. 
In Part 3, you will be asked to make another series of choices in decision problems. How much money you 
receive in Part 3 will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
In Part 4, you will be asked to make one last choice in a decision problem. Again, your decisions from 
preceding Part 2 and Part 3 will not affect your earnings in Part 4. 
In addition, upon completion of the experiment, you will receive a show-up reward of $5. This is yours to 
keep regardless of the decisions you make in the experiment. After you complete the experiment, you will be asked 
to fill out a questionnaire while you wait to be paid. 
Your computer has been assigned an ID number that you will be informed of. Your decisions and payoffs 
from the experiment will be recorded with that ID number. At no time your name will be linked to that ID number. At 
the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private. Your decisions and payoff will not be revealed to anyone during 
or after the experiment. 
Please turn off your cell phones now to avoid any interruption during the experiment. 
 
Part 1 – Cognitive Test 
You will now take a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 questions. You may use the margins of this 
booklet to work out your answer if needed. You may ONLY use pencil and paper provided. No other aids are 
permitted. All questions have the following format: 
Who is the current President of the United States? 
A. Mitt Romney 
B. Bill Clinton 
C. Barack Obama 
D. George W. Bush 
E. David Cameron 
To correctly answer this example question, you would select C. You will gain one point for each correct answer and 
zero for an incorrect answer. Try to get as many points as you can. Upon completion of Part 1 you will earn a certain 
amount of money. This amount may be the same for everyone in this room or each participant’s earnings may depend 
on their relative performance in the test.  
You will have 20 minutes to work on the test. You may not be able to finish all the questions in this time.  
 
Part 2 – Donation to a Charity 
In Part 2 of the experiment you will be randomly and anonymously matched into a group which consists 
of 3 participants. Based on the performance on the cognitive test in Part 1, all participants in your group will be 
ranked, and the highest ranked participant will earn $45, the middle ranked participant will earn $30, and the 
lowest ranked participant will earn $15. Then, each participant in your group (including you) will have an 
opportunity to donate to the same charity. However, each group will be randomly assigned to a different charity. 
When Part 2 starts, the name of the charity that your group is assigned to will be given to you on the computer 
screen. You can donate any amount to this charity from $0 to the amount earned with increments of 5 cents. The 
amount you donate will be deducted from the amount you earned. We will write a check in the total amount that 
you as well as the other participants in your group chose to donate and send it to the charity (If you want to get a 
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confirmation about your donation, please include your e-mail address in the sign out sheet and we will have the charity 
automatically email you the total amount of donation by your group). 
Here are several examples: 
• The numbers in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
• Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1.  
• If you donate $0 and 0 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $30.  
• If you donate $15 and 45 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $14 and 55 cents.  
• If you donate $30 to the charity then your remaining income is $0.  
You and the other members of your group will make donations simultaneously. You will learn your group’s 
total donation to the charity only at the very end of the experiment.  
After all three participants in your group make their donations, we will apply a tax rate of x% (which can 
be either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on each participant’s remaining income and collect the corresponding amount of 
money. Then we will evenly redistribute y% (which can be either 0%, 50%, or 100%) of the collected money among 
the participants of your group (including you).  
Here is an example: 
• The numbers in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
• Assume that the tax rate is 25% and the redistribution rate is 50%.  
• Next, assume that based on the performance on the cognitive test in Part 1, participant 1 was ranked 3rd 
earning $15, participant 2 was ranked 2nd earning $30, and participant 3 was ranked 1st earning $45 (see 
column 2 in the table below).  
• Also, assume that participant 1 donated $10 to the charity, participant 2 donated $0, and participant 3 donated 
$20 (see column 3 in the table below).  
• Therefore, we will send a check for $30 ($10 + $0 + $20) to the charity.  
• Then, on each participant’s remaining pre-tax income (see column 4), we will apply a tax rate of 25% (see 
column 5), collecting $1.25 from participant 1, $7.5 from participant 2, and $6.25 from participant 3 ($1.25 
+ $7.5 + $6.25, for a total $15). So, after tax participant 1 will have $3.75 remaining (since participant 1 
donated $10 and there was a tax of 25% on the remaining $5, leaving participant 1 with $3.75). Similarly, 
participant 2’s and 3’s remaining after-tax income will be $22.5 and $18.75, respectively (see column 6).  
• Then, 50% of the total amount of $15, collected as taxes from all three participants, will be evenly 
redistributed among the three participants. Therefore, each participant will receive a redistribution amount of 
$2.5 (0.5×$15 divided by 3).  
• So, the final income of each participant (see column 8) will be the sum of the after-tax income (see column 
6) and the redistribution amount (see column 7). In this example only 50% of the collected taxes were 
redistributed back. The amount that has not been redistributed goes back to the experimenter, and not 
to the charity. 
Table 1 
(tax rate = 25% and redistribution rate = 50%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Participant Initial 
income 
Charity 
donation 
Pre-tax 
income, 
(2) - (3) 
Tax, 
(4)×25% 
After-tax 
income, 
(4) - (5) 
Redistribution 
amount, 
0.5×Total(5)/3 
Final 
income, 
(6) + (7) 
1 $15 $10 $5 $1.25 $3.75 $2.5 $6.25 
2 $30 $0 $30 $7.5 $22.5 $2.5 $25 
3 $45 $20 $25 $6.25 $18.75 $2.5 $21.25 
Total $90 $30 $60 $15 $45 $7.5 $52.5 
 
We will ask you to make 10 decisions of how much you would like to donate to the assigned charity under 
different combinations of the tax rate and the redistribution rate. Specifically, on your computer screen you will see 
a table with 10 lines (also as shown below). In each line you will state how much you would like to donate to the 
charity. You should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line will be the 
‘line that counts’ and will be implemented. 
When tax rate is 0%, no tax will be collected. Therefore, your final income is simply equal to your pre-tax 
income (initial income – donations to charity). When tax rate is not 0%, your final income may be lower or higher 
than your pre-tax income depending on the tax rate, redistribution rate and the donation decisions of group members.  
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Table 2 
Decision 
Line 
Tax rate Redistribution rate 
How much would you like to 
donate to the charity? 
1 0% N/A  
2 25% 100%  
3 50% 100%  
4 75% 100%  
5 25% 50%  
6 50% 50%  
7 75% 50%  
8 25% 0%  
9 50% 0%  
10 75% 0%  
 
To facilitate your decisions, we will provide a "calculator”. You may use the calculator to see your final 
income for any potential donation plans you have in mind before actually making the donation decision. To use the 
calculator, first enter the tax rate, redistribution rate and the possible donation decisions by you and the other 
participants in your group. The calculator will then fill in the numbers in Table 1 for you. You can use the calculator 
as many times as you like. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw one line for payment. We will implement the 
choices of each participant made in that line and will send the contributed amount to the charity. Also, we will apply 
the appropriate tax rate and the redistribution rate to compute final income for each participant. You will learn which 
line was drawn, your earnings corresponding to that line and your group’s total donation to the charity at the very end 
of the experiment.  
Your decisions in Part 2 do not have any effect on your earnings in Part 3 or Part 4. 
 
An Understanding Check: (All participants need to pass this before the decision making part of the experiment) 
1. Suppose you contribute $15 to your group’s assigned charity, and the other group members contributed $5 
and $10. How much money will the experimenter send to this charity on behalf of your group? Answer: $30 
2. Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1. Suppose you contribute $10 to your group’s 
assigned charity, what is your pre-tax income? Answer: $20 
3. Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1. Suppose you contribute $10 to your group’s 
assigned charity, and the tax rate is 50%, what is your after-tax income? Answer: $10 
4. Suppose the total amount of taxes collected from your group is $30 and the redistribution rate is 50%, then 
how much money will you get back? Answer: $5 
5. If your after-tax income is $10 and if you also receive $5 back from the redistribution of tax revenue, what 
is your final income? Answer: $15 
 
Part 3 – 15 Decision Problems 
In Part 3 of the experiment, you will be asked to make choices in 15 decision problems. How much money 
you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
On your computer screen you will see a table with 15 lines (as shown below). In each line you will state 
whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Option A always offers a 50% chance to get $9 and a 50% chance to get 
$1, while Option B always offers a certain amount for sure (between $0.50 and $7.50, depending on the line). You 
should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line will be the ‘line that 
counts’ and will be paid out.  
At the end of the experiment, for each participant, the computer will randomly draw one line for payment. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose A in that line, then the computer 
will randomly choose either $9 or $1 with equal chances as your payment. If you chose B in that line, then you will 
receive for sure the exact amount that is specified by Option B in that line. 
Your decisions in Part 3 do not have any effect on your earnings in Part 4. The actual earnings for this part 
will be determined at the end of Part 4. 
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Table 1 
Decision 
Line 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $0.50 for sure  
2 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $1.00 for sure  
3 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $1.50 for sure  
4 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $2.00 for sure  
5 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $2.50 for sure 
 6 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $3.00 for sure 
7 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $3.50 for sure  
8 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $4.00 for sure  
9 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $4.50 for sure  
10 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $5.00 for sure 
 11 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $5.50 for sure 
12 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $6.00 for sure  
13 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $6.50 for sure  
14 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $7.00 for sure  
15 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance $7.50 for sure  
 
Part 4 – One Decision Problem 
In Part 4 of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room. Nobody 
will ever learn whom they were matched with. You will be asked to choose between the following four options: 
Option 1: You will receive $2.00 and your paired participant will receive $2.00. 
Option 2: You will receive $1.75 and your paired participant will receive $3.00. 
Option 3: You will receive $2.25 and your paired participant will receive $1.00. 
Option 4: You will receive $2.00 and your paired participant will receive $1.75. 
Similarly your paired participant will decide between these four options.  
After you and the other participant make your decisions, the computer will also randomly determine whose 
decision to implement. If the computer chooses your decision to implement, then the earnings to you and the other 
participant will be determined according to your choice. If the computer chooses the other participant decision to 
implement, then the earnings will determined according to the other participant choice. 
The actual earnings for this part will be determined after everyone makes their decisions. 
 
Part 5 – Questionnaire 
 
1. How hard did you work in the first part of the experiment in a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates little work and 
10 indicates extremely hard work. 
 
2. What is your gender? 
a) male 
b) female 
 
3. What is your age in years? 
 
4. What is your major? 
 
5. Family income: 
a) less than 50,000 
b) between 50,000 and 75,000 
c) between 75,000 and 100,000 
d) between 100,000 and 150,000 
e) between 150,000 and 200,000 
f) more than 200,000 
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6. What proportion of your own income comes from your own work? 
a) less than 20% 
b) between 20% and 50% 
c) between 50% and 70%  
d) more than 70% 
 
7. What is the importance of religion in your life? 
a) extremely important 
b) very important 
c) important  
d) somewhat important 
e) not very important 
f) not important at all 
 
8. In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 
a) extreme left 
b) left 
c) left-center 
d) center 
e) right-center 
f) right 
g) extreme right 
 
9. How would you place your views on this: “Hard work doesn´t bring success - it´s more a matter of luck and 
connections” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
10. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most? 
a) Income taxes are annoying and mostly unnecessary 
b) Income taxes are annoying but necessary 
c) Income taxes are necessary and do not bother me 
 
11. How would you place your views on this: “It is very annoying if the tax revenues are used for things I do not 
care for.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree  
d) I am indifferent  
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
g) I completely disagree 
 
12. How would you place your views on this: “It is the government’s job to ensure that everyone is provided for.” 
a) I completely agree  
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
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g) I completely disagree 
 
13. If the government had a choice between reducing taxes or spending more on social programs like health care, 
social security, and unemployment benefits, which do you think it should do? 
a) Reduce taxes 
b) Spend more on social programs 
 
14. How would you place your views on this: “I often consider what others will think of me before I make a decision 
in my life.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
15. Do you agree with the following statement: “I regularly give to religious organizations.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
16. Do you agree with the following statement: “I regularly give to charities (excluding religious organizations).” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
g) I completely disagree 
 
17. How well do you know the charity assigned for your group in Part 2? Please rate it in a 1 to 10 scale where 1 
indicates little information and 10 indicates a perfect knowledge about this organization. 
 
18. Are you a United States citizen? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
Instructions for the Robustness Treatment 
(Only the first two parts have some differences and therefore only these are given below.) 
 
Part 1 – Cognitive Test 
You will now take a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 questions. You may use the margins of the 
booklet to work out your answer if needed. You may ONLY use pencil and paper provided. No other aids are 
permitted. 
All questions have the following format: 
 
Who was the President of the United States during 2009-2017? 
A. Mitt Romney 
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B. Bill Clinton 
C. Barack Obama 
D. George W. Bush 
E. David Cameron 
 
To correctly answer this example question, you would select C. You will gain one point for each correct 
answer and zero for an incorrect answer. Try to get as many points as you can. Upon completion of Part 1 you will 
earn a certain amount of money. This amount may be the same for everyone in this room or each participant’s earnings 
may depend on their relative performance in the test.  
You will have 20 minutes to work on the test. You may not be able to finish all the questions in this time.  
 
PLEASE WAIT FOR THE FACILITATOR TO TELL YOU WHEN TO BEGIN 
 
Part 2 – Donation to a Charity 
In Part 2 of the experiment you will be randomly and anonymously matched into a group which consists 
of 3 participants. Each group will consist of one participant with high relative performance on the cognitive test in 
Part 1, who will receive $45, one participant with middle relative performance, who will receive $30, and one 
participant with low relative performance, who will receive $15. Note that if there are any ties during this process, 
they will be randomly broken by the computer. At the beginning of Part 2 you will learn how much you earned based 
on your performance in Part 1. Then, each participant in your group (including you) will have an opportunity to donate 
to the same charity. However, each group will be randomly assigned to a different charity.  
When Part 2 starts, the name of the charity that your group is assigned to will be given to you on the computer 
screen. You can donate any amount to this charity from $0 to the amount earned in increments of 5 cents ($0.05). 
The amount you donate will be deducted from the amount you earned in Part 1. We will write a check in the 
total amount that you (as well as the other participants in your group) chose to donate and send it to the charity. If you 
want to get a confirmation about your donation, please include your e-mail address and subject ID number in the sign 
out sheet and we will have the charity automatically email you the total amount of donation by your group. 
 
Here are several examples: 
• The donation amounts in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
• Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1.  
• If you donate $0 and 0 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $30.  
• If you donate $15 and 45 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $14 and 55 cents.  
• If you donate $30 to the charity then your remaining income is $0.  
 
You and the other members of your group will make donations simultaneously.  
After all three participants in your group make their donations, we will apply a tax rate of x% (which can be 
either 25%, 50%, or 75%) to each participant’s remaining income, and collect the corresponding amount of money. 
Then we will evenly redistribute 50% of the collected money among the participants of your group (including you).  
  
Here is an example: 
• The numbers in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
• Assume that the tax rate is 25% and recall that the redistribution rate is 50%.  
• Next, assume that based on the performance on the cognitive test in Part 1, participant 1 earned $15, 
participant 2 earned $30, and participant 3 earned $45 (see column 2 in the table below).  
• Also, assume that participant 1 donated $10 to the charity, participant 2 donated $0, and participant 3 donated 
$20 (see column 3 in the table below).  
• Therefore, we will send a check for $30 ($10 + $0 + $20) to your group’s assigned charity.  
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• Then, to each participant’s remaining pre-tax income (see column 4), we will apply a tax rate of 25% (see 
column 5), collecting $1.25 from participant 1, $7.50 from participant 2, and $6.25 from participant 3 ($1.25 
+ $7.5 + $6.25, for a total $15). So, after taxes, participant 1 will have $3.75 remaining (since participant 1 
donated $10 and there was a tax of 25% on the remaining $5, leaving participant 1 with $3.75). Similarly, 
participant 2’s and 3’s remaining after-tax income will be $22.5 and $18.75, respectively (see column 6).  
• Then, 50% of the total amount of $15, collected as taxes from all three participants, will be evenly 
redistributed among the three participants. Therefore, each participant will receive a redistribution amount of 
$2.5 (0.5×$15 divided by 3).  
• So, the final income of each participant (see column 8) will be the sum of the after-tax income (see column 
6) and the redistribution amount (see column 7). Note that only 50% of the collected taxes were 
redistributed back. The amount that has not been redistributed goes back to the experimenter, and not 
to the charity. 
 
Table 1 
(tax rate = 25% and redistribution rate = 50%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Participant Initial 
income 
Charity 
donation 
Pre-tax 
income, 
(2) - (3) 
Tax, 
(4)×25% 
After-tax 
income, 
(4) - (5) 
Redistribution 
amount, 
0.5×Total(5)/3 
Final 
income, 
(6) + (7) 
1 $15 $10 $5 $1.25 $3.75 $2.5 $6.25 
2 $30 $0 $30 $7.5 $22.5 $2.5 $25 
3 $45 $20 $25 $6.25 $18.75 $2.5 $21.25 
Total $90 $30 $60 $15 $45 $7.5 $52.5 
 
There are 15 rounds in Part 2. In each round, we will ask you to make a decision regarding how much you 
would like to donate to the assigned charity under a given tax rate. You should think of each round as a separate 
decision you need to make. Only one round, however, will be the ‘round that counts,’ and will be implemented. 
Note that your final income may be lower or higher than your pre-tax income depending on the tax rate and 
the donation decisions of group members.  
To facilitate your decisions, we will provide a “calculator”. You may use the calculator to see your final 
income for any potential donation plans you have in mind before actually making the donation decision. To use the 
calculator, first enter the tax rate given in that round and the possible donation decisions by you and the other 
participants in your group. The calculator will then fill in the numbers in Table 1 for you. You can use the calculator 
as many times as you like. 
At the end of each round, you will learn your group’s total donation to the charity. In addition, you will be 
provided with information on your pre-tax income, tax payment, after-tax income, redistribution amount and your 
final income for that round. The computer will apply the appropriate tax rate and the redistribution rate to compute 
the final income for each participant in your group, including you. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one round for payment. We will implement 
the choices of each participant made in that round and will send the contributed amount to the charity. Also, each 
participant will receive earnings corresponding to that round. 
Your decisions in Part 2 do not have any effect on your earnings in Part 3 or Part 4. 
 
PLEASE WAIT FOR THE FACILITATOR TO TELL YOU WHEN TO BEGIN 
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Appendix C: Supplement to Theoretical Predictions 
Here, we provide theoretical predictions for our experiment under the following utility 
functional form: 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃 + 𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺1−𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃 . The predictions rely on the assumption that everyone is a 
contributor. If this assumption does not hold, quantitative results change, but the qualitative results 
on the effect of the tax rate and the degree of waste do not change. Table C1 shows the predictions 
when the public goods utility is weighted at a = 1/2, while Table C2 shows the predictions when 
a = 1/4. 
 
Table C1: Theoretical predictions under specific utility functions with a = 1/2 
 
Tax rate, 𝑡𝑡  Waste, 𝑤𝑤 𝜃𝜃 = 1 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
𝜃𝜃 = 3/4 𝜃𝜃 = 1/2 𝜃𝜃 = 1/4 
0% - 4.29 3.50 2.31 0.61 
25% 0% 5.00 4.33 3.21 1.24 
50% 0% 6.00 5.55 4.74 2.86 
75% 0% 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 
25% 50% 4.67 4.09 3.13 1.33 
50% 50% 5.29 5.07 4.66 3.57 
75% 50% 6.52 7.02 8.11 11.91 
25% 100% 4.29 3.81 3.00 1.41 
50% 100% 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 
75% 100% 4.29 5.21 7.50 17.14 
Maximum possible donation level 
for a given preference structure for 
0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 1 10.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
 
 
Table C2: Theoretical predictions under specific utility functions with a = 1/4 
 
Tax rate, 𝑡𝑡  Waste, 𝑤𝑤 𝜃𝜃 = 1 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
𝜃𝜃 = 3/4 𝜃𝜃 = 1/2 𝜃𝜃 = 1/4 
0% - 2.31 1.50 0.61 0.04 
25% 0% 2.73 1.88 0.87 0.08 
50% 0% 3.33 2.48 1.34 0.20 
75% 0% 4.29 3.50 2.31 0.61 
25% 50% 2.53 1.77 0.85 0.09 
50% 50% 2.90 2.24 1.32 0.25 
75% 50% 3.66 3.25 2.54 1.19 
25% 100% 2.31 1.64 0.81 0.09 
50% 100% 2.31 1.86 1.20 0.31 
75% 100% 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 
Maximum possible donation level 
for a given preference structure for 
0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑤 ≤ 1 6.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
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 Appendix D: Supplementary Analysis and Discussions 
Table D1 provides robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5 and Table 4. 
For convenience, regression (1) in Table D1 replicates the estimation results of regression (3) in 
Table 4. Regression (2) adds an additional interaction term 𝑡𝑡×𝑤𝑤. Regression (3) further adds 
interaction terms 𝑤𝑤×Unequal, 𝑡𝑡×Unequal and 𝑡𝑡×𝑤𝑤×Unequal. Note that upon adding these 
controls, the qualitative results originally reported in regression (1) do not change. Giving 
significantly decreases in the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤, but it does not change in the tax rate 𝑡𝑡. 
 
Table D1: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 𝑡𝑡  -0.27 -0.76 0.06 
  [tax rate] (0.85) (0.79) (1.37) 𝑤𝑤  -4.13*** -4.64*** -3.95** 
  [degree of waste] (0.79) (0.94) (1.33) 
Income 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Unequal 1.66 1.66 1.88 
   [1 if the Unequal treatment] (1.33) (1.33) (1.56) 𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤   1.03 -1.57 
  [interaction term]  (1.84) (2.88) 𝑡𝑡 × Unequal   -1.43 
   [interaction term]   (1.66) 𝑤𝑤 × Unequal   -1.19 
   [interaction term]   (1.77) 𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤 × Unequal    4.51 
  [interaction term]   (3.78) 
Constant -0.30 -0.05 -0.17 
  [constant term] (2.79) (2.76) (2.76) 
Observations 1836 1836 1836 
Clusters 204 204 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
Table D2 provides further robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5 and 
Table 4. Here, we focus separately on each income group (i.e., participants who received $15, $30, 
or $45) in the Unequal treatment. Consistent with our previous results, regressions (2) and (3) 
show that giving of middle income individuals (who received $30) and high income individuals 
(who received $45) significantly decreases in the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤, but it does not change in the 
tax rate 𝑡𝑡. Regression (1) also shows that giving of low income individuals (who received $15) 
decreases (although not significantly) when 𝑤𝑤 increases.  
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Table D2: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Unequal Unequal Unequal 
Income $15 $30 $45 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 𝑡𝑡  0.11 -2.07 -3.94 
  [tax rate] (1.01) (1.27) (3.21) 𝑤𝑤  -0.77 -7.22*** -10.56* 
  [degree of waste] (0.81) (1.99) (4.30) 𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤  -3.17 5.26 11.07 
  [interaction term] (1.83) (3.16) (7.53) 
Constant 2.29* 4.52*** -1.68 
  [constant term] (1.06) (1.33) (3.72) 
Observations 342 342 342 
Clusters 38 38 38 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
Table D3 examines if there is any non-monotonic relationship between giving and income 
in the Unequal treatment (also see Tables D5-D6). Recall that in Table 4 and Table D1 the Income 
coefficient is not significant. It is possible, however, that there is a non-monotonic relationship 
between giving and income. To examine this, we provide pairwise comparisons of different 
income individuals. For example, regression (1) uses the data from individuals with low income 
(who received $15) and middle income (who received $30). As we can see, the Income coefficient 
is not significant. The same is true for regressions (2) and (3). 
 
Table D3: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Unequal Unequal Unequal 
Income $15 and $30 $15 and $45 $30 and $45 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 𝑡𝑡  -0.71 -0.80 -3.05* 
  [tax rate] (0.81) (1.41) (1.46) 𝑤𝑤  -3.51*** -3.91* -9.08*** 
  [degree of waste] (1.00) (1.70) (2.20) 
Income 0.10 0.01 -0.10 
  [income = $15, or $30, or $45] (0.10) (0.08) (0.19) 𝑡𝑡 × 𝑤𝑤  0.27 1.00 8.22* 
  [interaction term] (1.79) (3.47) (3.77) 
Constant 0.91 0.42 6.17 
  [constant term] (2.33) (2.70) (7.05) 
Observations 684 684 684 
Clusters 76 76 76 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table D4 provides robustness checks for our regressions presented in Table 4. We repeat 
the same analysis as in Table 4 by running OLS regressions (instead of Tobit regressions). Tables 
D5 and D6 repeat same regressions as in Table 4 and Table D4, respectively, but instead of using 
a continuous income variable, they use dummies for high and low income. 
 
Table D4: OLS regressions of giving 
 For 𝑡𝑡 > 0% For all 𝑡𝑡 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  0.38 0.76 0.59 0.43 1.02 0.76 
  [tax rate] (0.58) (0.75) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (0.47) 𝑤𝑤  -1.84** -1.43* -1.61*** -1.83*** -1.37* -1.57*** 
  [degree of waste] (0.55) (0.63) (0.42) (0.49) (0.53) (0.37) 
Income  0.08 0.08  0.08 0.08 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Unequal   0.84   0.77 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (0.65)   (0.65) 
Constant 3.76*** 1.9 1.23 3.73*** 1.67 1.1 
  [constant term] (0.60) (1.26) (1.51) (0.53) (1.16) (1.46) 
Observations 810 1026 1836 900 1140 2040 
Clusters 90 114 204 90 114 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the participant level. 
 
Table D5: Tobit regression of giving 
 For 𝑡𝑡 > 0% For all 𝑡𝑡 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  -0.46 -0.07 -0.27 0.34 1.47 0.95 
  [tax rate] (1.11) (1.23) (0.85) (1.09) (1.20) (0.83) 𝑤𝑤  -4.26*** -3.91*** -4.12*** -4.06*** -3.54*** -3.83*** 
  [degree of waste] (1.05) (1.13) (0.79) (0.95) (0.97) (0.70) 
High  -0.91 -0.7  -1.04 -0.82 
  [1 if income = $45]  (2.61) (2.53)  (2.55) (2.49) 
Low  -1.41 -1.43  -1.73 -1.73 
  [1 if income = $15]  (1.88) (1.78)  (1.85) (1.76) 
Unequal   2.37   2.35 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.66)   (1.63) 
Constant 1.47 2.24 0.46 0.91 1.32 -0.3 
  [constant term] (1.22) (1.67) (1.20) (1.11) (1.56) (1.14) 
Observations 810 1026 1836 900 1140 2040 
Clusters 90 114 204 90 114 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table D6: OLS regression of giving 
 For 𝑡𝑡 > 0% For all 𝑡𝑡 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  0.38 0.76 0.59 0.43 1.02 0.76 
  [tax rate] (0.58) (0.75) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (0.47) 𝑤𝑤  -1.84** -1.43* -1.61*** -1.83*** -1.37* -1.57*** 
  [degree of waste] (0.55) (0.63) (0.42) (0.49) (0.53) (0.37) 
High  0.84 0.84  0.78 0.78 
  [1 if income = $45]  (1.52) (1.51)  (1.50) (1.50) 
Low  -1.48 -1.48  -1.58 -1.58 
  [1 if income = $15]  (0.90) (0.89)  (0.89) (0.89) 
Unequal   1.06   1.04 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (0.86)   (0.85) 
Constant 3.76*** 4.43*** 3.54*** 3.73*** 4.29*** 3.46*** 
  [constant term] (0.60) (0.91) (0.54) (0.53) (0.81) (0.47) 
Observations 810 1026 1836 900 1140 2040 
Clusters 90 114 204 90 114 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the participant level. 
 
 
Table D7 provides robustness checks for our regressions presented in Table 5. We repeat 
the same analysis as in Table 5 by running OLS regressions (instead of Tobit regressions). 
 
Table D7: Giving and the curvature of the utility function (OLS) 
 More than 7 safe choices Less than 7 safe choices  
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 𝑡𝑡  0.55 -0.48 -0.04 0.14 3.47 1.81 
  [tax rate] (0.84) (0.71) (0.54) (0.84) (1.76) (0.99) 𝑤𝑤  -1.87* -2.82** -2.42*** -1 0.04 -0.48 
  [degree of waste] (0.77) (0.99) (0.66) (0.57) (1.11) (0.62) 
Income  0.03 0.03  0.05 0.05 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Unequal   -0.07   1.38 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.05)   (0.94) 
Constant 4.19*** 4.26* 3.92 2.82** 0.53 0.24 
  [constant term] (1.00) (1.63) (2.25) (0.84) (2.32) (2.20) 
Observations 333 450 783 351 351 702 
Clusters 37 50 87 39 39 78 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table D8 provides robustness checks for our regressions presented in Table 6. We repeat 
the same analysis as in Table 6 by running OLS regressions (instead of Tobit regressions). 
 
Table D8: The determinants of giving (OLS) 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) 𝑡𝑡  0.59 0.53 0.53 0.53 
  [tax rate] (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 𝑤𝑤  -1.61*** -1.67*** -1.67*** -1.67*** 
  [degree of waste] (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) 
Income 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Unequal 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.91 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment] (0.65) (0.63) (0.59) (0.59) 
Egalitarian   0.83 0.33 0.31 
  [1 if ($2.00; $2.00)]  (0.70) (0.71) (0.71) 
Generous   4.40** 4.35*** 4.32** 
  [1 if ($1.75; $3.00)]  (1.56) (1.30) (1.30) 
Hardwork    -0.33* -0.33* 
  [how hard you worked in part 1]   (0.15) (0.15) 
Female    2.08** 2.09** 
  [1 if female]   (0.73) (0.73) 
Family income   0.06 0.06 
  [family income]   (0.16) (0.16) 
Right-wing   0.46 0.45 
  [right-wing political view]   (0.31) (0.32) 
Unnecessary   -0.71 -0.67 
  [1 if taxes are annoying and unnecessary]   (1.02) (1.03) 
Necessary   1.06 1.11 
  [1 if taxes are necessary and do not bother]   (1.56) (1.59) 
Reputation   -0.04 -0.03 
  [importance of own reputation]   (0.22) (0.22) 
Church   0.25 0.26 
  [giving to church]   (0.24) (0.24) 
Charity   0.33 0.33 
  [giving to charities]   (0.29) (0.30) 
Familiar    0.23 0.23 
  [knowledge of charity]   (0.13) (0.13) 
American   0.06 0.12 
  [1 if a United States citizen]   (0.85) (0.88) 
Part 1     0.06 
  [part 1 score]    (0.14) 
Constant 1.23 0.91 -2.37 -2.51 
  [constant term] (1.51) (1.43) (3.05) (3.09) 
Observations 1836 1827 1827 1764 
Clusters 204 203 203 196 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Next, we study heterogeneity in individual giving behavior. Although we find that, on 
average, giving decreases in the degree of waste and it does not change in the tax rate, there is 
substantial heterogeneity when examining individual behavior. Table D9 shows how different 
participants change their giving in response to changes in 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤. We categorize each individual 
by two dimensions: (i) how they respond to changes in 𝑡𝑡 and (ii) how they respond to changes in 𝑤𝑤. In Table D9, we combine the data from the Equal and Unequal treatments.  
 
Table D9: Individual giving in response to changes in 𝒕𝒕 and 𝒘𝒘 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡𝑡 Giving response  to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 56 0 0 0 0 56 
Constant 0 18 13 2 0 33 
Decreasing 0 1 38 2 8 49 
Increasing 0 0 11 13 6 30 
Other 0 0 13 0 23 36 
Total 56 19 75 17 37 204 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 38 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡𝑡 and in 𝑤𝑤. 
 
 
Table D9 shows that there are three main types of individuals that account for more than 
half of all observations (112/204). First, there are 56 participants who always give $0, independent 
of 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤. Second, there are 38 participants who weakly decrease their giving in response to an 
increase in 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤. Third, there are 18 participants who always give the same amount independent 
of 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤. Summing over each category, we see that the most common types of individuals are 
those who decrease their giving when 𝑤𝑤 increases (75 participants), those who always give $0 (56 
participants), and those who decrease their giving when 𝑡𝑡 increases (49 participants).  
We also make an interesting observation. Not including the participants with inconsistent 
choices, we see that out of 41 participants who consistently decrease their giving when the tax rate 
increases, 38 of them also decrease their giving when the degree of waste increases. In contrast, 
among 24 participants who increase their giving when the tax rate increases, only 13 participants 
consistently increase their giving when the degree of waste increases, while 11 of these 
consistently decrease their giving when the degree of waste increases. This observation is 
consistent with our Hypothesis 2. 
Table D10 and Table D11 provide robustness checks related to the previous discussion in 
Table D9. As in Table D9, we categorize each individual by two dimensions: (1) how they respond 
to changes in 𝑡𝑡 and (2) how they respond to changes in 𝑤𝑤. Unlike in Table D9, we split the data 
by the Equal and Unequal treatments. Table D10 and Table D11 show that in both treatments there 
are three main types of individuals that account for more than half of all observations: (1) 
participants who always give $0, disregarding 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤, (2) participants who weakly decrease their 
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giving in response to increases of 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤, and (3) participants who do not change their giving in 
response to changes in 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑤𝑤. 
 
Table D10: Individual giving response in the Equal treatment 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡𝑡 Giving response  to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 26 0 0 0 0 26 
Constant 0 7 4 1 0 12 
Decreasing 0 0 17 1 3 21 
Increasing 0 0 4 6 4 14 
Other 0 0 7 0 10 17 
Total 26 7 32 8 17 90 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 17 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡𝑡 and in 𝑤𝑤. 
 
Table D11: Individual giving response in the Unequal treatment 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡𝑡 Giving response  to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤𝑤 Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 30 0 0 0 0 30 
Constant 0 11 9 1 0 21 
Decreasing 0 1 21 1 5 28 
Increasing 0 0 7 7 2 16 
Other 0 0 6 0 13 19 
Total 30 12 43 9 20 114 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 21 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡𝑡 and in 𝑤𝑤. 
 
 
 
